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San Giorgio Group Case Study Overview 
This paper is one of a series – prepared by Climate Policy Initiative 
for the San Giorgio Group – examining the use of public money 
to catalyze and incentivize private investment into low carbon 
technologies and draw lessons for scaling-up green, low-emissions 
funding. The San Giorgio Group case studies seek to provide real-
world examples of what works and what does not in using public 
money to spur low carbon growth. Through these case studies 
CPI describes and analyzes the types of mechanisms employed 
by the public sector to deal with the risks and barriers that 
impede investment, establish supporting policy and institutional 
development and address capacity constraints. 
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Executive Summary
In this case study, we analyze the experience of Tunisia’s 
Prosol program, through which the Tunisian government 
seeks to achieve a long-standing goal of transitioning 
households away from water heaters run on fossil fuels 
to solar water heaters (SWHs). The Prosol example pro-
vides insights into how a developing country can align 
domestic and international support to level the playing 
field between low carbon technologies and heavily sub-
sidized fossil fuel based alternatives. 
Launched in 2005, Prosol is a joint effort of the 
Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Energy and Small and 
Middle Size Enterprises; the National Agency for 
Energy Conservation of Tunisia; and the United Nations 
Environment Programme. Prosol also received financial 
backing from the Italian-led Mediterranean Renewable 
Energy Program. The program built upon the experience 
of two earlier initiatives that failed to deliver long-term 
results. In particular, these previous efforts failed to 
address SWH market-specific issues (lack of an ade-
quately mature supply chain, reliability of technology, 
lack of financing options), and did not provide a frame-
work to tackle the market barriers, such as the up-front 
cost of the technology and subsides for fossil fuel-based 
alternatives, that rendered SWHs a less attractive 
investment option. Prosol itself developed in phases, 
with Phase II’s enhancements based on learnings from 
Phase I.
The Prosol program was designed to address three main 
challenges:
1. Leveling the competitive playing field by offering 
subsidies for SWHs to help offset the subsidy 
advantage of the dominant liquefied petroleum 
gas-fired systems; 
2. Building-up both the demand and supply sides of 
the SWH market, including by raising consumer 
awareness of and confidence in the technology, 
training installers, creating accreditation and quality 
certification programs as well as developing an 
after-sales maintenance network;
3. Overcoming the absence of consumer credit for 
renewable energy investments and reliable credit 
performances by involving the state utility to act as 
debt collector, guarantor and enforcer. 
The following table summarizes how the Program 
addressed stakeholder-specific barriers to investment.
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Who Issue Prosol Responses and Effects
Lo
ca
L a
ut
ho
ri
ti
es
Fossil fuel subsidies distorted 
the economics of solar water 
heater investments
Prosol helped make solar water heaters more attractive relative to 
fossil fuel heating alternatives by subsidizing part of the upfront 
investment. 
Public resources are limited 
due to budget constraints
The Prosol investment subsidy for solar water heater was set to a 
level that helped even the playing field with the fossil fuel-based 
alternative, without providing more subsidy than necessary.
International financial aid was 
not sufficient by itself to create 
sustainable long-term impacts
In the Prosol case, international aid played a specific role: to 
kick-start the Program by helping build infrastructure that addresses 
the needs of commercial banks, households, and the solar water 
heater industry. After the kick-start phase, the local authorities took 
over support of the Program, including:
•	 investment of local resources
•	 assigning an experienced local agency to be in charge of 
Program implementation and management
•	 concerted engagement of the state owned-utility and local 
banks, which led to increased access to affordable credit.
in
te
rn
at
io
na
L D
on
or
s/
ag
en
ci
es
Both non-economic and 
economic barriers prevented 
deployment of renewable 
technologies
International aid addressed:
•	 non-economic barriers by funding awareness initiatives 
targeting households and banks and training local government 
staff, technology suppliers and installers
•	 economic barriers by supporting the incremental up-front cost 
of the technology with an investment subsidy and the cost of 
credit with interest rate abatement.
ho
us
eh
oL
Ds
Many households were not 
aware of solar water heaters’ 
economic benefits, did not 
trust that they were reliable, 
and could not afford them. 
Prosol raised awareness about the economic benefits of solar water 
heaters through targeted and continuous information campaigns, 
and built confidence in the technology through quality and certifica-
tion measures.
The program helped make solar water heaters more affordable by 
reducing up-front investment requirements and prompting banks to 
offer concessional financing. 
Will SWH investments still be 
appealing when public support 
is removed?
Prosol efforts to improve understanding of the value added of 
the technology may support a more responsible and long-term 
investment in solar water heaters, despite lower short term profit-
ability. However, continued subsides on fossil fuels will make this 
transition challenging, and may undermine Prosol efforts once public 
support is removed.
co
m
m
er
ci
aL
 B
an
ks
Risk aversion and lack of 
understanding of green-tech-
nology financing contributed to 
capital shortages in the market.
The role of the state utility as debt collector, enforcer and loan 
guarantor shifted the credit risk from lenders to borrowers, unlocking 
financial resources, while improving the overall credit performance 
of residential borrowers.
Training programs have built banks’ expertise in financing renewable 
energies. Awareness-building initiatives have communicated the 
profitability potential of the market to banks.
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Has Prosol been effective?
The CPI approach to effectiveness analysis relies on a 
framework which aims to illustrate that there is a causal 
relationship between inputs and returns/benefits. In 
order to apply this approach across different cases, we 
have adopted a common set of appropriate criteria and 
indicators that can be applied to systematically measure 
the performance of the investment in question.
Our objective in these case studies is to draw lessons 
for scaling up and replicating best practices to other 
sectors, technologies, and geographies. In the case of 
Prosol, we evaluate the main features introduced by the 
Program in terms of technology development, environ-
mental benefits and economic results. These include 
the leveraging effects of public money to the amount of 
GHGs avoided, and take into account our assessment of 
the financial sustainability of the Program thanks to the 
savings obtained in fossil fuels subsidies. 
Over the analyzed time frame (2005-2010), total public 
and private investment in Prosol amounted to USD 134 
million. The outcomes achieved include savings in fossil 
fuel subsidy expenditures by the Tunisian Government, 
avoided CO2 emissions, increased energy indepen-
dence, and economic development. In particular: 
•	 Prosol shows that targeting public resources to 
directly support renewable energy investments 
can effectively shift demand away from fossil 
fuels, even where fossil fuel subsidies are in 
place.
•	 The annual capacity installed, in terms of 
collector area, increased fivefold compared to 
the previous initiative, with a total installed base 
of about 119,000 systems. 
•	 Remarkably, there results were achieved at 
a net gain for the public budget. The study 
shows that between 2005-2010 the shift in 
consumers’ demand shaved USD 15.2 million 
off Tunisia’s fossil-fuel subsidy outlay. These 
savings are projected to reach USD 101 million  
over the life span of the SWHs, which means 
that the Program will more than compensate 
the Government’s original USD 21.8 million 
investment.
•	 Other benefits include 251 Ktoe of avoided fossil 
fuel consumption and 715 Kt CO2 emissions 
over the life span of the SWH installed.
•	 In terms of economic development, the 
domestic solar thermal industrial cluster 
grew significantly; it is also estimated that 
about 3,000 new jobs were possibly created 
– although job losses observed in more con-
ventional industries should also be taken into 
account.
Current and planned SWH incentive programs in the 
MENA and Balkan regions are now assessing the fea-
sibility and sustainability of scaling up and replicating 
the Prosol model in different institutional, regulatory, 
economic and cultural contexts.
Lessons for future low carbon investments:
Our analysis of Prosol suggests a number of lessons for 
how to encourage effective investments in renewable 
technologies:
•	 Investments in mechanisms that offset the 
incremental cost of green technologies with 
respect to emission intensive alternatives can 
result in net savings for governments. When 
fossil fuel subsidies are in place, financing 
support for the up-front investment must coun-
terbalance market distortions in order to level 
the playing field between purchasing alterna-
tives and divert demand for dirtier ones. 
•	 Tackling knowledge and information barriers 
from the outset can be decisive. Initiatives that 
address these issues represent opportunities 
for international partners (including develop-
ment agencies) to have high value and relatively 
low-cost impact.
•	 The careful allocation of risks among key 
actors can help attract banks and other 
private investors. In the Prosol case, the state 
utility STEG assumed default risks by taking 
on the role of debt repayment enforcer and 
loan guarantor, and passed these risks on to 
consumers by withholding services in the event 
of non-payment.
•	 Quality standards and capacity-building can 
address technology risks or perception of such 
risks. Prosol established a training program 
and accreditation scheme for suppliers and 
installers, SWH certification and performance 
labeling, supplier-provided SWH component 
guarantees, and after-sale maintenance 
contracts. These measures helped reduce 
technology failure rates to approximately 1%.
•	 A sufficiently committed and capable national 
agency to (help) design, promote, implement 
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and manage programs or projects is essential, 
not least, to build capacity at every stage of 
the value chain. The Tunisian National Agency 
for Energy Conservation (ANME) successfully 
addressed the implementation challenges by 
coordinating and engaging local and interna-
tional stakeholders.
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1. Introduction
In October 2011, Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) and the 
World Bank Group, in collaboration with China Light 
& Power (CLP) and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), launched the 
San Giorgio Group, a new working group of key finan-
cial intermediaries and institutions actively engaged in 
providing green, low-emissions finance.1
The San Giorgio Group recognizes that a major barrier 
to scaling up climate investment flows is the limited 
availability and understanding of empirical evidence 
or ‘on the ground’ examples of financial practices, 
environmental policies and political signals that drive 
green investment. The goal of the San Giorgio Group 
is to fill this gap by drawing on the experience of its 
members to track and analyze the life cycle of existing 
projects, programs and portfolios, and assess results 
and mechanisms that affect financial and environmental 
performance of these investments. In so doing we aim 
to distill lessons about evolving financing practices and 
provide insights on how to scale up climate finance and 
spend resources more wisely. 
Our inquiries are framed by four overarching questions:
•	 What is the role and reasons of public finance?
•	 How can public money be best delivered 
(instruments and institutional channels)?
•	 How to ensure alignment of international and 
national public investment flows with each other 
and with private investment?
•	 How can effective investment and continued 
learning be ensured?
San Giorgio Group case studies share a systematic 
analytical framework. They explore in depth the role 
of project stakeholders, the sources of return for the 
various stakeholders, the risks involved and arrange-
ments to deal with them, and case-specific develop-
ments and lessons in replicating and scaling up best 
practices. 
The Prosol Tunisia financing facility (Prosol) stands 
out as an example of how international and local public 
support addressed critical demand-side barriers that 
were preventing the widespread deployment of a com-
mercially viable renewable energy technology – in this 
instance, Solar Water Heating (SWH) – in a developing 
country. 
1 For additional information see CPI website, http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/
event/inaugural-meeting-of-the-san-giorgio-group/.
Prosol was initiated in 2005 by the Tunisian Minister 
for Industry, Energy and Small and Medium Enterprises 
and the National Agency for Energy Management 
with the financial support of the Italian Ministry of 
the Environment for the Protection of Land and Sea 
(MATTM) and the technical support of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). As high-
lighted in Table 1, the Program aimed to target specific 
constraints along the SWH technology continuum, 
particularly those that were – and to some extent still 
are – preventing this mature technology from reaching 
market independence. Designed for the Tunisian resi-
dential sector, Prosol encompassed multiple interrelated 
measures that provided households with incentives to 
purchase SWHs, drew-in private investors by reallocat-
ing investment risks and drove reforms in the energy 
subsidy framework.
The Facility addressed competitiveness concerns by 
adjusting the market distortions generated by pervasive 
subsidies on fossil fuel-based water heating alternatives; 
provided access to concessional finance and tackled 
lenders’ perceived risks about SWH technology and 
market potential, by setting up a system of guarantees. 
It overcame information asymmetries and the scarce 
awareness about the added value of ‘green’ investments 
through targeted capacity building measures for financ-
ers and suppliers; this, also allowed to improve the 
quality of the products offered.
This case study focuses on the 2005-2010 period of 
the Prosol Residential Program, which saw the tran-
sition from the donor-funded to the locally-funded 
phase. In section 2 we present the design characteris-
tics of the Prosol financial mechanism, outline the policy 
context within which the Program developed and the 
main stakeholders involved. Along with its contextu-
alization within the SWH technology continuum, this 
helps us to examine and evaluate the Prosol financing 
facility, understanding how, why and if it achieved its 
stated objectives. 
In section 3 we explore the Program’s economics and 
how the different types of incentives and measures 
influenced stakeholders’ investment decisions, on both 
the public and private side. We present an analysis of 
investment economic and environmental returns for 
each stakeholder group followed, in section 4, by a 
detailed risk-analysis, examining the allocation arrange-
ments adopted to mitigate the main risks involved in the 
Program, and address their potential impacts.
Section 5 focuses on the role played by Prosol in 
influencing the Tunisian energy subsidy framework, 
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which ultimately resulted in significant savings for the 
public budget. In addition, it also examines the strategy 
adopted to engage local financial institutions in renew-
able energies financing that facilitated the scale up of 
available investment capital.
Finally, in section 6, we draw together the lessons 
learned across the life of the Program and assess the 
potential scalability and replicability of the Facility 
both in Tunisia and beyond. We identify those aspects 
that might be applied successfully in other contexts 
and explore the challenges that, quite likely, would 
need to be addressed by governments, suppliers and 
commercial entities to ensure the long-term viability of 
renewable energies deployments. 
Our hope is that the lessons offered by Prosol will 
provide governments, financial intermediaries and 
private entities with some clear examples of successful 
approaches to promote green investment by shifting 
public resources and private demand, create opportuni-
ties, and establish enabling conditions for the deploy-
ment of renewable energies. In particular, this case 
study shows how a limited amount of public money has 
been used to ‘crowd-in’ private investment, helping to 
improve both the carbon footprint and the economic 
profile of Tunisia.
Table 1. The continuum of SWH technology development and the policy objectives, barriers, and public finance interventions at each stage
Note: This case study focuses on the financial instruments used by Prosol, highlighted in red, above. SWH technology has already moved past the stages 
and instruments in gray text. Source: CPI elaboration based on Climate Bonds Initiative & Irbaris (2011), UNEP SEFI (2008), UNEP and Partners (2009) 
and UNEP SEF Alliance (2010).
PO
LI
CY
 
OB
JE
CT
IV
ES
Innovation
Proof-of-concept at scale
Support market-pull & scale-up Ongoing market growth
BA
RR
IE
RS High tech risks & costs
Uncertain economic payoffs
High initial investment
Market competitiveness 
Limits to economies of scale
Competitiveness concerns
Fossil fuel subsidies
Access to finance
Lenders & borrowers low understanding/expertise
PU
BL
IC
 FI
NA
NC
E 
IN
TE
RV
EN
TI
ON R&D/project grants
Incubators
Public VC Funds
Investment grants; technical assistance grants; concessional loans; guarantee arrangements
Public private parnerships
Mezzanine finance
Public PE funds
RD&D TARGET DEPLOYMENT MASS MARKET DIFFUSION COMMERCIAL MATURITY
   S T A G E S  O F  M A R K E T  D E V E L O P M E N T    
 3A CPI Report
San Giorgio Group Case Study: Prosol TunisiaJune 2012
2. Prosol Residential - 
Program overview 
The Program entailed – and still entails – a combination 
of measures that aimed to overcome critical demand-
side barriers to the development of a sustainable SWH 
market. It established:
•	 an investment subsidy to lower end-users’ 
capital cost and enhance SWHs2 competitive-
ness vis-à-vis conventional liquefied petroleum 
gas-fired systems that were (and remain) 
dominant in the market; 
•	 a mechanism to facilitate consumers’ access 
to credit and overcome the lack of tailored 
end-user financing options - by facilitating a 
temporary interest rate subsidy (7% in the first 
twelve months, 3% in the following six), a 50% 
reduction in interest rates (from ~12% to ~6%), 
and longer repayment terms (from 3 years to 5 
years);3
•	 a series of awareness-raising campaigns 
2 Only SWH models with 200 and 300 litres capacity compliant with certain 
quality standards were commercialized with the backup of Prosol Residen-
tial (ANME, 2005).  
3 This implies that households contracting loans in the first 12 months of the 
Program were charged a 0% interest rate, 4% in the subsequent 6 months 
(Touhami, 2011; Menichetti and Touhami, 2007).
Prosol (‘Program Solaire’) is an end-user financing facility jointly 
developed by the Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Energy and Small 
and Middle Size Enterprises (MIEPME); the National Agency for 
Energy Conservation of Tunisia (ANME); and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP). Prosol was backed by the 
Italian-led Mediterranean Renewable Energy Program (MEDREP). 
Launched in April 2005, it aimed to accelerate the penetra-
tion of SWH in the Tunisian residential sector by engaging local 
financial institutions to provide credit lines to consumers.
addressed consumers’ skepticism about 
SWHs and informed commercial banks about 
renewable energy (RE) investments and 
associated market potentials;
•	 a capacity-building strategy to ensure local 
domestic financial institutions and technology 
providers develop long-term knowledge and 
expertise;
•	 an accreditation scheme for suppliers/installers 
and SWH models, as well as monitoring 
procedures to ensure the quality and reliabil-
ity of systems which are important factors in 
stimulating and sustaining demand; 
•	 the development of carbon credits under a 
programmatic Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) – in phase two – that will be used to 
finance the continuation and scale up of the 
Program itself.
It should also be added that with the aim to improve 
technology levels, decrease costs and support the 
manufacturing and installation of SWH in the country, 
in 2006 the Tunisian Government reaffirmed VAT 
exemption for SWHs, and reduced custom duties to the 
minimum rate of 10 % (versus a general rate of 18%) 
(Decree n° 744-95; Decree n° 4-2006).
 • Even in the case of a mature technology such as solar water heating, bilateral public funding may be 
essential to ‘tip the balance’ and enliven policy interventions in order to drive uptake and promote 
market independence.
 • A multi-stakeholder approach that employs a variety of ad hoc measures can address audience-specific 
barriers to renewable energy deployment.
prosol
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Program Timeline
The Tunisian Government’s (GoT) long-standing inter-
est in exploiting its REs potential4 – including SWHs 
policy support initiatives – dates back to the 1980s in 
the context of stagnating supply from national hydro-
carbon resources,5 rising international energy prices, 
and growth in the national demand (GIZ, 2009). Even 
though SWHs could potentially meet up to 70-80% 
of Tunisia’s residential hot water demand (Menichetti 
and Touhami, 2007), over 70%6 of it was met through 
heavily subsidized imported fossil-based sources – spe-
cifically, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) – at significant 
cost to the national budget and the environment.
Prosol developed in a favorable institutional, legisla-
tive, and political framework for the deployment of 
renewable energies technologies,7 building upon the 
experience of two earlier initiatives that failed to deliver 
long-term effects following their conclusion, hence 
demonstrating the value of learning lessons within the 
project life-cycle.8 In particular, these previous pro-
4 MED-EMIP (2010) estimates the REs potential in terms of installed capacity 
of main REs technologies (PV, SWH, wind, hydro, biomass and municipal 
landfill gas) achievable in the country at 148 MW in 2010, with the potential 
to increase up to 2,365 MW by 2020. SWHs installed in the residential and 
commercial sector are estimated to represent about 20% of the total.
5 Tunisia, formerly in a relatively stable energy balance surplus of approxi-
mately 3 Mtoe/per annum in the ‘80s, thanks to its oil reserves, lately 
started to record declining production rates versus growing demand rates 
and, in 1994, registered for the first time a deficit of 124 Ktoe, that become 
permanent as of 2000.
6 Before the start of the Program, in 2003, LPG-fired boilers represented 
78.4% of the existing stock, electric system 10.4% while natural gas-fired 
8%. Solar thermal appliances represented 3.2% only (Menichetti and 
Touhami, 2007 based on Missaoui and Amous, 2003). 
7 The Tunisian Government started to promote a conducive regulatory 
framework as early as 1985 with the establishment of a dedicated National 
Agency for Energy Conservation (ANME), the promulgation of the Energy 
Conservation Law in 1990 – amended with Law No. 72-2004 that stated 
the rationale use of energy as a national priority – and of the Investment 
Incentives Code (1993). The Code (amended by subsequent legislative acts), 
a main point of reference for domestic and foreign investors, set a system of 
incentives and of direct and indirect financial allowances (e.g., VAT excep-
tions and reduced custom duties) aimed to support investments in energy 
conservation measures and in research, production and commercialization 
of REs, with the objective of promoting domestic exports (Republic of 
Tunisia, 1993; OECD, 2012a). 
8 The Government started to incentivise the uptake of SWHs in 1984, through 
a series of advantageous financial and investment conditions that proved 
to lead to unsuccessful results due to quality and maintenance issues. This 
initial intervention was followed in 1996 by a second one funded by the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) together with Belgian co-financing (USD 
6.6 million in total), which comprised a direct subsidy of 35% of the SWH 
price and a capacity building component. Despite demonstrating successful 
grams failed to address SWH market-specific issues 
(reliability of technology, lack of financing options) 
and did not provide a framework to tackle the market 
barriers, such as transaction costs and fossil fuel sub-
sides, that rendered SWH a less attractive investment 
alternative.
The Program timeline (Figure 1) shows the impor-
tant milestones of the Prosol Residential Program and 
illustrates how the participation of stakeholders evolved 
over time. 
The Program comprises two phases: 
•	 Prosol I (2005-2006), which we define as 
‘the suppliers lending phase’, since individual 
suppliers acted as indirect lenders and debt 
guarantors for consumers. It was kick-started 
with funds from the Italian Ministry of the 
Environment for the Protection of Land and Sea 
(MATTM) – an essential ‘tip the balance’ to 
make the Program possible – which provided a 
USD 2.2 million grant to support:
 » the 20% subsidy on SWH capital costs (USD 
1 million) funded via the Mediterranean 
Renewable Energy Centre (MEDREC); 
 » a temporary interest rate subsidy (USD 1 
million) gradually phased out after 18 months 
– funded via UNEP. This facility aimed to 
create incentives for householders to apply 
for favorable credit terms to purchase SWH 
systems, and to help banks rapidly achieve a 
critical mass of loans;
 » USD 0.2 million for capacity-building, 
awareness-raising campaigns, and Program 
support costs. 
After a few months of operations, buoyed by the early 
results, the Tunisian Government (GoT) passed a leg-
islation mandating that SWHs installed in the residen-
tial sector be eligible for a 20% capital cost subsidy.9 
The GoT committed to implement such change at the 
in stimulating market growth, once donor funds ended in 2002, the SWH 
market collapsed from 17,000 m2 installed in 2001 to 7,500 m2 in 2004. 
Thus, the SWH market proved to be still commercially immature and to 
require additional public support (ANME, 2010a; Haselip et al., 2011). World 
Bank (2004) reports that the audience initially targeted by the GEF-funded 
initiative (namely, hotels, schools, sports centres, etc.) had a smaller market 
potential than the residential sector, owing to imprecise estimates undertak-
en at appraisal – then revised during the implementation – and, particularly, 
did not consider upfront how to bring the Program’s effects forward. 
9 Law n° 82-August 2005 – implemented by Law n° 106-December 2005 – 
and Decree n° 2234-August 2005.
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E and introduced incentivising m
easures for REs
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DECREE 744-95
Created ANM
E and introduced incentivising m
easures for REs 
and introduced fiscal advantages for SW
H
LAW
 82-2005
••M
ade SW
H eligible for energy subsidies
••Defined the financing system
 for the energy 
conservation strategy 
LAW
 72-2004 ON ENERGY CONSERVATION
M
andated the rational use of 
energy as a national priority
TRIENNIAL PROGRAM
 ON ENERGY CONSERVATION
Set a goal of reducing 
energy dem
and by 8%
 
(700 ktoe) by 2007
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outset of the Program, if a certain volume of installa-
tions were achieved during its initial phase. It was the 
first policy intervention of this kind, as energy subsi-
dies had previously been directed exclusively toward 
fossil fuel sources.
Through the same legislative acts, the Government 
also created an ad hoc National Fund for Energy 
Conservation (FNME) to be financed through fiscal 
measures, in order to ensure a stable stream of public 
financial support for REs and energy efficiency (EE) 
initiatives.10
•	 Prosol II (2007-2012),11 ‘the consumers lending 
phase’, introduced key improvements in the 
financing mechanism, namely, direct lending to 
households (via STEG) thereby relieving SWH 
suppliers from debt liability; STEG’s involvement 
as guarantor of households; and a wider choice 
of credit lines. In addition, in February 2009, 
the GoT changed the incentive framework from 
the 20% subsidy to a bonus of USD 150 to 
USD 300 based on the SWH collector area.12 
This change was designed to overcome a slight 
impasse observed in sales when the funds 
granted by the MATTM ended, and to promote 
market diversification by making the product 
more attractive to low-income households.
•	 This phase was mainly supported with Tunisian 
resources with a small supporting grant (about 
USD 210,000) provided by MATTM.
10 It was stated by law that the FNME would be financed through a tax on the 
first licence registration of vehicles, according to motor capacity, and custom 
duties on air conditioning equipment. See Law 2005-82 for details and 
exceptions: Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia: http://www.
iort.gov.tn/WD120AWP/WD120Awp.exe/CONNECT/SITEIORT.
11 The Program was intended to run till 2011, but it was recently extended 
to September 2012 as the USD 88 million (TND 117 million) plafond made 
available by Attijary Bank for the Program has not been exhausted as 
yet. MATTM supported Prosol II with funds unspent during Prosol I (USD 
94,080) and by making an additional contribution of about USD 130,000 in 
2008. Law 362-2009 was introduced to foster the manufacturing of SWHs 
with a smaller capacity (150 litres), which is more suited to low-income 
households’ needs, and to broaden the customer base that, owing to the 
expansion of the gas pipeline infrastructure, is likely to be found in more 
isolated areas and in Tunisia’s interior in the coming years.
12 Law 362-2009 introduced bonuses of USD 150 (TND 200) and USD 300 
(TND 400) for SWHs with collector area between 1-3 m2 and 3-7 m2, respec-
tively.
Over Prosol phases I and II (2005-2010), more than 
119,000 SWH systems totaling around 355,350 m2 of 
collector area were installed in Tunisia, with a  fivefold 
increase in annual deployment, achieving an average 
installation rate of about 59,225 m2 per year during this 
time frame, compared to the 10,662 m2 one observed 
under previous initiatives. Emboldened by these results, 
the GoT enhanced its target ambition and, with the 
Tunisian Solar Plan,13 announced its aim to achieve 
900,000 m2 in installed capacity by 2016. 
Program stakeholders
A broad group of international and national, govern-
ment and non-government stakeholders was involved 
in the development and implementation of the Prosol 
Program. Each played a distinct role in bringing the 
Program to life. Based on publicly available sources of 
information, we have categorized and mapped the eco-
nomic, financial and institutional linkages between the 
stakeholders involved in the two phases of the Prosol 
Residential Program in the ‘tube map’ (Figure 2).
We identify two main groups of stakeholders: those 
pertaining to the public sector, either international or 
national; and those belonging to the private sector: 
households, local banks and technology providers. Each 
of these had a particular role in the Program. The map is 
supported by a table that summarizes stakeholders’ role 
and contribution (Table 2).
13 The approximately USD 2.2 billion (TND 3.4 billion) Tunisian Solar Plan 
(Plan Solaire Tunisien – PST) is a two-phase initiative introduced in 2009, 
and part of the framework of international interventions that encompass 
the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the DESERTEC project. It provides a clear 
signal about the country’s intention to become a key player in the produc-
tion and export of solar energy. The first phase (2010-2016) aims to increase 
the share of REs in total electricity production by 16%, and achieve 25% in 
energy savings; the second phase, extending to 2030, fixes a 40% target 
for both RE and EE. The Plan, which includes Prosol, foresees 40 different 
projects in solar, wind, energy efficiency, and waste sectors, to be financed 
by private capital for 70% of the total. The Plan is expected to reduce fossil 
fuel consumption by 660 Ktoe/per annum, or 22% of the national energy 
consumption by 2016. Source: OECD (2012a) and http://www.pavingtheway-
msp.eu/fileadmin/paving-the-way/Tunisa.pdf. 
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Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference section). CC = Capital Cost; IR = Interest Rate.
Figure 2. Key stakeholders involved in Prosol I and Prosol II and their linkages.
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Stakeholder Description and role Financing role1
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MATTM
Italian Ministry for the Environment and Protection of Land and Sea
• actively engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation;
• operated in Tunisia within the MEDREP Finance Initiative;
• closely followed Program implementation through MEDREC.
Source: USD 2.4 million 
grant
UNEP-DTIE
United Nations Environment Programme Division of Technology, Industry and Economics 
• operates in Tunisia within the MEDREP Finance Initiative;2
• provided technical support and expertise to the Tunisian Government for the design and 
development of the Prosol financing mechanism;
• organized stakeholders’ consultations and engaged banks in the Program;
• contributed to the awareness raising and communication campaign activities.
Intermediary: channelled 
USD 1 million grant from 
MATTM
MEDREC
Regional Centre for training, knowledge sharing, and the development of REs pilot projects 
in the Mediterranean Region. 
• provided technical assistance and support in the establishment and management of 
Prosol;
• carried out capacity building activities.
Intermediary: channelled  
USD 1.2 million grant to 
ANME/FNME to cover the 
capital cost subsidy
D
om
es
tic
 p
ub
lic
 
TUNIsIAN Gov.
Ministry for Industry and Energy and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
• actively promote rational use of energy via direct support to renewable energies and 
energy substitutions;
• mandated by law an investment subsidy to lower the SWH upfront costs.
Source: USD 21.8 million 
grant
ANME3
National Agency for Energy Conservation
• is responsible for the implementation of the state policy for energy conservation 
through the rational use of energy, the promotion of REs, and energy substitution;
• participated in the design and promotion of Prosol; 
• is responsible for the overall implementation and management of Prosol;
• manages the FNME and channels granted funds to SWHs suppliers;
• designed the quality certification and the after-sales maintenance process.
sTEG
State-owned utility with a monopolistic position in the local power market (85% market 
share).4
• recovers end-user loan repayments through bills, and acts as enforcing agent;
• has acted as debt guarantor since Prosol II (2007).
sTB 
Tunisian National Bank (Prosol I)
• Trust fund manager for the interest rate subsidy granted by MATTM. It was involved 
in Prosol I as an intermediary because, per policy, UNEP cannot transfer donors’ funds 
directly to private banks, unless via tender.
Intermediary: channelled 
USD 8.4 million in loans and 
interest repayments to local 
banks
Pr
iv
at
e 
Se
ct
or
REsIDENTIAl-
CoNsUMERs
Mostly middle-income households (around 45.6% of the population) with relatively high 
education levels and mostly home-owners.5
Source: USD 50.3 million in 
investment capital and inter-
est repayments
TEChNoloGy 
PRovIDERs
SWH manufacturers, importers and installers
• responsible for installation and maintenance;
• act as financing intermediaries for the provision of credit to the households, and as debt 
guarantors in Prosol I.
BANkING sECToR
Private commercial banks (for Prosol I, total loans have been estimated from market share)
• Amen Bank underwrote loans for almost USD 4.7 million (Prosol I);
• Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l’Industrie (UBCI) underwrote loans for USD 2.6 
million (Prosol I);
• Attijari Bank underwrote loans for USD 52.5 million (Prosol II). 
Source: USD 59.8 million 
concessional loans
Table 2. Stakeholder’s description and role. 
1 Figures are actualized to 2005 with an average 2005-2010 inflation rate (IMF, 2011) and converted from the original currency to an average USD 2005-2010 
exchange rate (Oanda, 2012).
2 The MEDREP Finance Initiative is part of the broader Mediterranean Renewable Energy Program (MEDREP) launched by Italy in 2002 at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg.
3 ANME is a non-administrative public entity operating under the authority of the Ministry of Industry.
4 Until 1996 STEG had the monopoly on electricity and gas generation, transmission and distribution in Tunisia. Then, two IPPs were allowed to generate electricity 
to feed into the Tunisian grid. Market share data as of 2010.
5 The AfDB (2010) defines ‘middle class’ as population with a daily expenditure of USD 4-20 per day. Across the African continent, the middle-class population 
represents, in averages, 13.4% of the total (AfDB, 2010). In 2010, Tunisia ranked 83rd out of 172 countries in the Human Development Index ranking (Haselip, 2011; 
UNDP, 2010). Haselip et al., (2011) reports that 80% of Tunisian households own their home, making them more prone to invest in a SWH than tenants would be. 
Data as of 2010.
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3. Prosol Residential - 
investments, returns and 
profitability
This section addresses two main questions of the San 
Giorgio Group: What are the public and private financial 
inputs and what are the main outcomes and results of 
Prosol? It assesses how public funds enabled invest-
ments in renewable energies on one hand, and on the 
other, how international and national public targets 
were aligned with private expectations to achieve 
financial and non-monetary benefits for all stakeholders 
involved.  We begin the section by estimating the overall 
investment value of the Program, quantifying individual 
financial contributions across the public and private 
sectors before estimating the return streams accruing to 
each of Prosol’s sponsors.14
Investments:  Who pays for what? 
We estimate the investment in the overall Program 
during 2005-2010 at approximately USD 134 million 
(see Figure 3). The public sector provided 18% (USD 
24.2 million) of the total amount, while 82% (USD 
110 million) was provided by local private investors. 
Accordingly, we calculate that every dollar of public 
resources was able to mobilize almost five dollars of 
private capital. 
Public Finance Inputs
The Italian Government through MATTM granted 
USD 2.4 million to UNEP and MEDREC. Over 90% of 
these resources were allocated to the first phase of 
the Program. USD 1 million, channelled via MEDREC, 
was used to fund 20% of the capital cost of all new 
SWH installations, and USD 1 million financed UNEP’s 
14 The banks’ perspective on the Program economics is treated separately in 
Chapter 5. 
 • Each dollar of public finance invested in Prosol ‘crowded-in’ almost five dollars of domestic 
private capital.
 • With bilateral backing, which helped to address the market uptake risk, local actors took crucial 
legislative steps to counterbalance distortion from fossil-fuel energy subsidies. 
 • The displacement of fossil fuel subsidies provides significant public revenue returns and has the 
capacity to provide self-sustaining financing for the Program over the long term.
 • Program results need to be assessed within a broader framework encompassing financial as well 
as non-monetary benefits.
temporary interest rate subsidy facility. USD 200,000 
sustained accompanying measures and Program 
support costs.15 The second phase was financed with 
undrawn resources from Prosol I and an additional USD 
130,000 granted in 2008 by the Italian Government to 
the MEDREC to support the investment subsidy.16 On 
the whole, the Italian Government contributed about 
2% of the Program’s value, a small overall contribu-
tion, which has been however critical to kick-start the 
Program.
Through the FNME, the Government of Tunisia pro-
vided a USD 21.8 million grant to cover the capital cost 
subsidy.17 Due to data unavailability, this estimate does 
not include indirect subsidies18 and administrative and 
human resource expenses incurred by ANME to run the 
Program.19
The costs incurred by the state-owned utility STEG are 
also excluded, as we assume these are covered by a 
file service fee of USD 27 (TND 35.4) per system sold 
to cover the administrative costs associated with loan 
payments collection. This fee was included in the SWH 
15 This category includes communication and capacity-building activities. 
These costs do not include either MEDREC or MEDREP Prosol-related 
operating costs. 
16 MATTM internal data retrieved on December 2011; ANME, 2010a.
17 The contribution of the Tunisian Government was estimated by applying 
the 20% capital subsidy granted to solar collectors installed, capped at USD 
75/m2 (100 TND/m2), the maximum level of subsidy offered by GoT until 
2008. From 2009 onwards, it was computed considering a fixed subsidy of 
approximately USD 75/m2 (TND 100/m2), to reflect changes that occurred in 
the incentive framework (Decree n. 2009-362).
18 We did not include the foregone revenue associated to VAT exemption on 
imported equipment and the reduced custom duties (10% versus 18%) 
introduced to foster local industry competitiveness, and to ultimately reduce 
the investment cost for end-users (Decree 4/2006).
19 Since 2007 ANME has an internal unit dedicated to the Prosol Program with, 
at present, 14 employees. Associated costs, along with office facilities ex-
penses, are not incorporated in the overall grant served by the GoT, as it was 
not possible to separate ANME’s administrative costs from those related to 
the FNME, since both are housed in ANME’s budget.
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costs and paid by suppliers (MEDREC, 2008; Missaoui, 
2007). Over the 2005-2010 period, this charge totalled 
approximately USD 3 million. 
Private Finance Inputs
Improved investment conditions generated by the 
involvement of public money, and the risk management 
arrangements defined by the Program, helped to attract 
USD 110.2 million from the private sector, of which USD 
59.8 million comprised commercial bank loans covering 
about 70% of SWH system costs (e.g., Haselip et al., 
2011). The remaining USD 50.3 million was made up of 
direct payments for the residual SWH investment cost 
and interest rates repayments by end-users.20 
20 We assumed that loans and interest rates are repaid in 5 fixed-rate instal-
ments over the agreed repayment term. Values are netted of the interest 
rate facility served by MATTM for the initial 18 months, and actualized with 
an average 2005-2010 inflation rate (IMF, 2011). The concessional lending 
Public sector returns 
We use a stakeholder-specific perspective 
to ascertain the public sector returns gen-
erated by the over fivefold increase in the 
annual deployment rate of SWHs. Some 
of these have tangible fiscal and financial 
benefits, while others are relevant in the 
context of broader economic and environ-
mental considerations. 
The Tunisian Government 
perspective
The Tunisian Government support, with 
the 20-year commitment to the ‘maîtrise 
de l’énergie’ strategy – which frames 
the support for SWHs – aims to achieve 
multiple objectives and deliver as many 
benefits: the reduction of the country’s 
dependency on fossil fuels and related 
subsidies; the diversification of the energy 
mix through clean-energy generation; 
industrial growth and job creation;21 and 
the benefits associated with reduced GHG 
emissions including Certified Emission 
Reductions (CER) revenues generated 
under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).
With an estimated USD 101 million 
savings achievable over the expected 
life-time of the deployed SWHs, of which 
USD 15.2 million were achieved over the 
2005-2010,22 avoided LPG subsidies 
represent the most significant gain accruing to the 
Tunisian Government’s budget. Under the current 
policy scenario, USD 21.8 million of public resources 
will be paid back in less than 7 years, fully offsetting 
the GoT’s initial investment outlay. We acknowledge 
that if the publicly announced gradual phase out of 
rate is 7% for Prosol I, while in Prosol II is represented by the Tunisian 
Monthly Money Market rate TMM+1% (approx. 6.25%) in 2007 and 
TMM+1.2% (approx. 6.10%) in 2008-2010 (Menichetti and Thouami, 2007; 
ANME, 2007). To compute the volume of banks’ loans versus end-user 
finance, we apply an estimated credit-to-cash ratio of 50%-50% for Prosol I 
(2005-2006) and an average 76%-24% for Prosol II (2007-2010), based on 
STEG data.
21 Tunisia has long experienced high unemployment rates, stable above 14% 
during the 2005-2009 period, peaking at 44% among graduated young 
adult (15-29 years old). Source: Institut National de la Statistique, (2010); 
OECD (2012).  
22 This figure is estimated under the current policy scenario and actualized to 
2005 with the average inflation rate of the period considered (IMF, 2011).
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Figure 3. Program contributions by stakeholder and finance mechanism.
Note: Figures are actualized to millions of 2005 USD with an average 2005-2010 inflation rate 
(IMF, 2011) and converted from the original currency to an average USD 2005-2010 exchange 
rate (Oanda, 2012).
Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see References)
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fossil fuel subsidies by 2017 occurs (ANME, 2012b), 
LPG subsidies savings from Prosol will decrease to 
approximately USD 46 million (purple area in Figure 
4). However, we emphasize that were this to occur, 
the required SWH subsidies and dedicated financing 
mechanism would also be expected to contract, and 
would no longer be needed to correct the market distor-
tion induced by the LPG subsidies.23
Energy savings from SWH deployment represent 
another relevant benefit for the GoT. SWH capacity 
installed over the 2005-2010 time-frame has so far 
generated savings of approximately 47 Ktoe, or an 
estimated total 251 Ktoe over the expected lifespan of 
SWHs. This corresponds to a reduction in CO2 emis-
sions by 135 KtCO2 in the same period, or 715 KtCO2 
over the SWH life span.24 
In addition, with respect to the second phase of Prosol, 
part of the CO2 saved will translate into Emission 
Reduction Certificates (CERs)-related revenues because 
Prosol II has been registered as a programmatic CDM 
activity with estimated annual emission reductions of 
7.2 KtCO2 (TÜV SÜD, 2011).
25 In 2009, the CERs were 
sold through a bid process to Orbeo – an expert carbon 
23 Later, in Chapter 5 we show that in a ‘free-market’ scenario, in absence of 
both LPG and SWH subsidies, SWH technology results in a superior invest-
ment option for households.
24 See Appendix A for information on the methodology.
25 The amount refers to the SSC-CPA approved within the Program of Activity 
(PoA). Each PoA represents an umbrella within which may fall one or more 
CPAs. These, in turn, cannot exceed the applicable threshold, which for total 
installed thermal energy generation corresponds to a number of installed 
64,000 m2. Our calculations go beyond emissions eligible for CDM only.
assets broker (Orbeo, 2010). The associated revenue 
stream, potentially ranging between USD 350,000-
700,000, will be attributed to the FNME, and hence 
used to sustain the Program itself (ANME, 2010a; 
Touhami, 2011; IEA/IRENA).26
While acknowledging the relatively small scale of these 
benefits, we highlight that SWH deployment could 
generate far more significant impacts as the Program 
scales up from the residential to more energy-intensive 
sectors.
Local economic development
Prosol Residential has stimulated the development 
of the domestic solar thermal industrial cluster, with 
local actors playing a primary role. Before the launch of 
the initiative, in 2002, only eight suppliers were active 
in the SWH industry. Of these, only one was a local 
Tunisian supplier. In 2009, attracted by potential growth 
offered by the stable policy framework, the number of 
producers rose to 45, including nine local manufactur-
ers that represent approximately 80% of the market 
26 The estimate provided, takes into consideration primary CERs prices ranging 
from USD 7-13 (EUR 5-10), the lower bound being the lowest price for pri-
mary CERs according to Gorina (2009), while the highest bound being the 
cost of ‘pioneering credits’ – as Prosol can be considered as such according 
to ICIS (2011). Providing a precise estimate is difficult because the details on 
the actual purchase prices and payment terms are confidential and included 
in the Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) signed between 
ANME and Orbeo in 2009 (Orbeo, 2010). Personal discussions with ANME 
suggest that CERs will be paid in equal annual instalments and that the 
first payment will occur at issuance of credit. Values are not discounted for 
taking into account the potential risks related to CERs-issuance, CERs prices 
and restrictive clauses potentially included in the ERPA.
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(Baccouche, 2011).27 Production is generally carried out 
in partnership with international operators,28 suggesting 
that technology transfer is underway. Local manufac-
turing capacities are being developed and expanded, 
building potential export opportunities as well as market 
competition and diversification. In fact, the SWHs 
commercialized in the country have risen from only 20 
models in 2004 to 206 in 2010 (Baccouche, 2011), and 
the number of qualified installers from less than 100 
in 2002 to 1,200 in 2010 (Touhami, 2011), of which 
more than 400 are currently on the market (CSN.ER, 
MATTM, 2012).
We estimated an industry turnover during the 2005-
2010 of about USD 120.3 million, of which we associate 
USD 106.8 with manufacturers and USD 13.4 million 
with installers.29
Industrial developments are likely to positively influ-
ence the local job market. The solar thermal industry 
is actually relatively labour-intensive, with the instal-
lation and maintenance phases accounting for more 
than half of total employment (Hardie, 2011). Local 
stakeholders’ analyses suggest that Prosol promoted 
the creation of over 3,000 new direct jobs in the 
manufacturing, supplying, installation and after-sales 
areas, and up to 7,000 new indirect ones (e.g., ANME, 
2012b; Baccouche 2011; Touhami, 2011). More in-depth 
analyses are required to assess the robustness of 
such figures, including whether job losses potentially 
occurred in more-conventional industries have been 
adequately taken into account.30 We also acknowl-
edge that capacity-building activities and informational 
campaigns, as well as the certification and accreditation 
process introduced within Prosol, specifically aimed to 
embed capacity and create a skilled labor force over the 
longer term.
The international donor perspective
Benefits that accrue to the Italian Government 
27 Local stakeholders (March 2012) have however noted that out of this value, 
only 17 are actually operating in the market, which is, however, considered 
appropriate to satisfy local market needs.
28 For instance, Energie Del Sole-Italy, Soften-French, Sines-Greek, Techsol-
Turkey, BSI-Germany.
29 Estimates are based on yearly sales and SWH prices. The turnover ascribed 
to installers is estimated considering an average installation cost of USD 113 
(TND 150) and USD 151 (TND 200) for SWH with a capacity of 200 and 300 
litres respectively (Missaoui, 2009a).
30 The International Labor Organization (ILO) – within the Green Jobs Initiative 
launched jointly with UNEP in 2007 – is currently engaged in a series of 
initiatives aimed at developing approaches and methodologies to map and 
measure ‘green jobs’ that stem from ‘green’ interventions. 
(MATTM) from its direct support to Prosol and on-
going bilateral cooperation in Tunisia include:
•	 expanded markets and industrial co-operation 
opportunities for Italian companies;31
•	 strengthened economic and institutional 
relationships with local policymakers and 
stakeholders, in view of the development 
of cross-border electricity interconnections 
between the two countries (Terna.it).
Although it was initially envisaged, the Italian 
Government was unable to benefit from the Kyoto 
compliance credits generated by Prosol II that were 
sold through a bidding process to Orbeo. Following this 
experience, MATTM financing for other interventions in 
the country (Prosol Tertiary and Prosol Elec) was made 
conditional on an ex ante agreement on the purchase of 
CERs potentially generated (MATTM, 2011). 
Program returns for UNEP include achievement of its 
mission to promote a transition towards a low-carbon 
development; enhanced experience, knowledge, reputa-
tion (including with donors), and expertise in financing 
sustainable energy initiatives in developing countries. 
Private sector returns
The end-user perspective
We estimate overall reductions in households’ energy 
bills to be approximately USD 605-1,325 per SWH over 
its expected life-cycle.32 What makes the investment 
more appealing under Prosol is the possibility for house-
holds to use those bill savings to cover investment costs 
in an acceptable period of time, with affordable upfront 
investment costs. 
The different incentive measures introduced by 
Prosol – the capital cost subsidy, the softened credit 
condition and longer repayment terms – significantly 
lowered SWH system costs for residential consumers: 
SWHs’ Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE)33 decreased 
31 Based on MATTM data we estimate that as of 2010 2.5% of the SWHs 
installed in Tunisia under Prosol Residential were of Italian origin. Around 
11% of the suppliers working in the country have an Italian partner. 
32 This range reflects results obtained for SWHs with 200 and 300 litres ca-
pacity over systems’ expected life span (15 years), and considering that the 
purchase of a SWH replaces a LPG-fired water heating systems. Expected 
cash flows are discounted by the households’ cost of capital (or opportu-
nity cost), represented by the rate of Tunisian treasury bonds with 5 years 
maturity (5.44%). 
33 The Levelized Cost of Energy is meant the (present value of) total invest-
ment costs and revenues for each kWh of energy generated by the SWH. 
This provides a single, aggregated measure of costs associated with energy 
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indeed from USD 9.7 cents/kWh to USD 7.3 cents/
kWh during the first phase (around 25% less) and to 
USD 8 cents/kWh during the second (around 18% 
less). Breaking down in detail the contribution of the 
individual measures to the reduction of LCOE, capital 
cost subsidy represents the highest support, resulting in 
11-12% of LCOE reduction. Improved financing, calcu-
lated as the benefits deriving from extended loan repay-
ment terms and below-market interest rates (6-7% 
versus 13%),34 contributes for about 4-6% to overall 
reduction. The interest rate subsidy, finally, accounts for 
an additional 9% reduction of LCOE.
We assume that these reduced costs resulted in direct 
benefits to household purchasers, namely: 
•	 Lower upfront investment barrier to SWHs. 
Since SWHs cost around USD 950 and USD 
1,300 respectively for 200 and 300 litres of 
capacity, these investments represent a burden 
of around 25-34% of per-capita annual income 
(IMF, 2011) narrowing the potential market 
to middle/high-income customers. Prosol 
overcame this initial cost barrier, bringing 
upfront payments down to – or even below – 
the level of conventional water heater market 
prices thanks to direct subsidization and to the 
provision of credit lines to be reimbursed at 
fixed rates via the electricity bill.
•	 Improved profitability and payback of the 
SWH. Prosol, in fact, reduced SWH payback 
by around 4 years, narrowing the ‘competi-
tiveness gap’ with the LPG-based alterna-
tive. Nevertheless, the payback period is still 
production, which can be compared across technologies (Varadarajan et al., 
2011). See Appendix A for details. The higher LCOE of Prosol II reflects the 
fact that this phase did not benefit from the interest rate subsidy provided 
by MATTM through UNEP in the first 18 months of the Program.
34 The concessional lending rate is 7% for Prosol I while, in Prosol II, is 
represented by the Tunisian Monthly Money Market rate TMM+1% (approx. 
6.25%) in 2007 and TMM+1.2% (approx. 6.10%) over the 2008-2010 time 
frame. 
somewhat long when compared to high-
efficient conventional alternatives35 (Table 
3),36 confirming that, alongside the improved 
financial profitability, other factors such as 
energy prices expectations, higher energy 
independence and environmental benefits, 
played a determinant role in influencing final 
investment choices. Local stakeholders today 
believe that Prosol had a tangible cultural 
effect on households, inducing changes in 
their investment behaviours (ANME, 2012b; 
MEDREC, 2011).
Has Prosol been effective?
A key objective of the San Giorgio Group’s framing 
questions is to facilitate an overall assessment of 
whether money is being spent wisely. As a first step 
toward answering this question, we track progress from: 
initial financial inputs (public – made up of international 
and domestic resources, and private investment) and 
consider what that investment actually pays for (that 
is, the direct outcomes it enables). Next, we consider 
interim benefits that flow from (and are contingent on) 
direct outcomes, through to the final outcomes which 
go toward meeting the Program’s overarching environ-
mental and economic objectives.  
•	 Our approach builds on CPI’s effectiveness 
framework and aims to illustrate that there is 
a relationship between inputs and returns/
benefits. In order to apply this approach across 
different cases, we have adopted a common set 
of appropriate criteria (such as LCOE baselines, 
energy saved, development of local industries, 
etc.) and indicators that can be applied to 
systematically measure the performance of the 
investment in question.
•	 In the case of Prosol, we highlight the main 
features introduced by the Program in terms 
of technology development, environmental 
35 Investment in a SWH is compared to high-efficient conventional LPG-fired, 
natural gas-fired and electric water heaters (ANME, 2010a). It has to be 
noted that the choice of the level of efficiency of the substituted water 
heater has a strong impact on the expected revenue stream of the invest-
ment and associated payback period. In fact, when adopting low-efficient 
alternatives, e.g. for LPG, the payback is reduced up to 5-8 years. 
36 These figures represent the midpoint of paybacks resulting from SWH sys-
tem with 200 and 300 litres capacity. Estimates for alternative investments 
in conventional water heaters are based on data retrieved from ANME 
(2010a) and average 2005-2010 energy prices corresponding to: electric-
ity USD 9.58 cents/kWh, LPG USD 3.15 cents/kWh, and natural gas USD 
1.77 cents/kWh, with prices increasing over the time at the average annual 
growth rate observed during the same period.
Table 3. Payback period comparisons for SWHs with and without Prosol 
versus conventional water heating alternatives
Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference section).
w/o Prosol Prosol I Prosol II
Conventional 
water heating 
alternatives
Natural Gas 22 16 18
LPG 14 10 11
Electric 7 <1 1
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benefits and economic results. These include 
the leveraging effects of public money to the 
amount of GHGs avoided, and take into account 
our assessment of the financial sustainabil-
ity of the Program given the displacement of 
Table 4. CPI’s effectiveness framework: from resources to ultimate results.
Note: (*) Timeframe of the Program considered, 2005-2010. LPG subsidies avoided, energy savings and CO2 emissions avoided are computed over the SWHs 
expected life-time (15 years).
INPUT DIRECT OUTCOME INTERIM BENEFITS FINAL OUTCOME
•	 Public finance: USD 
24.2 million
•	 Private finance: USD 
110.2 million
•	 Policy reforms 
supporting REs.
•	 LCOE reduced by 
18-25%
•	 SWH payback 
reduced by about 4 
years
•	 Total 119,036 SWHs 
installed (or 355,350 
m2) 
•	 Fivefold increase 
in annual REs 
deployment (m2)
•	 Public to private 
leverage: 1:5
•	 Energy savings: 251 
Ktoe* 
•	 Displacement of 
fossil generation 
•	 Number of SWHs 
producers: + 37
•	 Possibly > 3,000 new 
direct jobs
•	 LPG subsidy avoided: 
USD 101 million* 
•	 CO2 avoided: 715 
ktCO2* 
•	 Reduced energy 
dependence on fossil 
fuel imports
•	 Local economic 
development (local 
manufacturing, 
industrial cluster 
development) 
•	 Knowledge/
Expertise embedded
•	 Scale up and rep-
lication of Prosol 
key features in the 
country, in the MENA 
Region and beyond 
fossil fuel subsidies. The aim is to clarify the 
relationship between investments and returns 
and benefits which could be relevant for other 
sectors, countries or portfolios.
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4. The importance of proper 
risk allocation
To understand how risks are allocated among stake-
holders, we have applied a step-wise risk management 
framework to the Prosol Residential financing mecha-
nism. We: (1) identify and assess individual risks; (2) 
analyze and present the mitigation instruments adopted 
to address critical risks; and (3) we outline the risk allo-
cation implications for the Program’s stakeholders. We 
also underline the changes that occurred between the 
two phases of Prosol, and their impact on shifting risk 
allocation among agents.
(1) Risk identification and assessment
To ensure we capture all the significant sources of 
risk, we have categorized risks along three major 
dimensions:37
37 This approach builds upon the typical project risk breakdown along 
development stages by adding the ‘outcome’ dimension, which is dedicated 
to the overarching results of the Program. Acknowledging the degree of 
subjectivity embedded in this approach, and that some risks are interrelated 
and may involve more than one dimension, the San Giorgio Group strives to 
systematically capture these three dimensions across case studies.
•	 ‘Development’ risks refer to risks associated 
with the design and implementation phase 
of the Program; funds management and 
governance; accreditation criteria for suppliers 
and installers; SWH models’ compliance 
standards;
•	 ‘Operations’ risks include all risks associated 
with running the process, i.e., the functioning 
of systems installed; the ability to secure the 
required capital; debt default risks; interest rate 
flotation; delivery and pricing of carbon-related 
finance; 
•	 ‘Outcome’ risks cover risks more specific to 
high-level public policy objectives such as failure 
to meet energy, socio-economic, environmental 
and industrial targets. 
Risk events with low probability of occurrence and low to medium impact: 
•	 Failure to secure total capital costs: accepted and shared between different 
capital sources, that is the public budget and commercial banks;
•	 Interest rate flotation: borne by the banks offering fixed-rate loans and 
managed through a periodic reset of a fixed margin over a floating interest rate 
(TMM).
L O W - R I S K  E V E N T S
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Risk events with moderate-probability of occurrence, but medium-high impacts.
•	 Households’ default on debt repayment: borne by banks but hedged via explicit 
credit guarantees (from the suppliers and, subsequently, from the STEG) and 
through the electricity/gas service suspension in case of non-repayment;
•	 Program failure: borne by the Program’s proponents and sponsors (GoT, ANME, 
UNEP, MATTM) addressed through specific policy/mechanism design/imple-
mentation strategy arrangements. 
Pr
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Impact
M O D E R A T E - R I S K  E V E N T S
 • There is evidence of effective risk-sharing between public and private entities in most parts of the 
Program, with individual risks allocated to the stakeholders best suited to bear them. 
 • The involvement of STEG, a low-cost, very efficient and highly enforceable debt collection agent was 
crucial. STEG’s ability to suspend electricity and gas services for non-payment shifted the risk of default 
from banks to households, allowing a significant reduction of financing costs.
 • Equipment risks were addressed through training, certification, and other support initiatives.
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Next, we systematically classify the identified risks 
according to two criteria: their probability/frequency of 
occurrence (from very low to very high), and their grade 
of impact on the Program’s financial and non-financial 
objectives (from very low to very high).
(2) Risk analysis and response strategies38
This analysis focuses on the drivers and impacts of the 
main risks identified in the above categories, particu-
larly: SWH equipment malfunctioning or faults, and 
households’ debt default. Whatever the probability, the 
occurrence of any one of these risks could potentially 
undermine Prosol’s objectives, and threaten its long-
term sustainability.
i. SWH failure risks and associated impacts 
on the profitability of the investment
In Tunisia the probability of failure of installed systems 
primarily rests on the availability of skilled and trained 
laborers to install and maintain the systems, rather than 
on the technology itself which is now considered reli-
able and mature. 
The theoretical cumulative default probability risk of 
a SWH, due to the absence of maintenance, tends to 
increase exponentially with time, from 11% after one 
year of operation, the first covered by full guarantee, 
to 81% at its 15th year, the end of its expected lifetime 
(Missaoui and Marrouki, 2009b). This ‘no mainte-
nance’ scenario has negative effects on the investment 
payback – which increases on average by 10-14 years39 
– and on the energy bills savings generated over the 
38 Consistent with e.g., UNEP-SEFI (2008), we consider four typical risk 
responses: (1) risk avoidance (eliminate the risk or protect against it) 
by changing project scope or adding resources to it (e.g., by improving 
maintenance); (2) risk transfer (transfer of the financial impact) to a more 
suitable/capable party; (3) risk mitigation (reduce probability or impact 
to an acceptable level) and (4) risk acceptance (address the risk should it 
occur). See e.g., OECD (2012b) for a detailed analysis of the risks associated 
to low carbon projects. 
39 These figures, which are computed as per Table 3, represent the midpoint 
of the payback increases resulting for SWH of 200 and 300 liters capacity 
when maintenance is not regularly carried out,.
system’s expected lifetime, which decreases by as much 
as 32% (see Appendix B).
Given the diffuse negative perception of the SWHs’ reli-
ability owing to weaknesses in previous SWH initiatives 
(ANME, 2010a), and SWHs’ lower competitiveness 
vis-à-vis alternatives, several mitigation measures were 
adopted:40
•	 accreditation scheme for suppliers/installers 
based on eligibility criteria, run by ANME, which 
helped to ensure that minimum standards were 
applied; 
•	 training and capacity-building initiatives 
targeting installers to help build long-term job 
skills;
•	 certification of SWH models based on a series 
of technical requirements and performance 
standards set by ANME and, more recently, 
in 2010, the introduction of a quality labelling 
system;41
•	 random on-site spot checks of newly installed 
systems;
•	 guarantees of SWH components provided by 
suppliers: 1 year on the whole system, 5 years 
for the tank, 10 years for the collector (panel); 
and
•	 establishment of an after-sale service (via 
40 Some of them became available (e.g. qualified installers, after-sale service) 
or were introduced (e.g., quality labels) over time.
41  Following up a customer satisfaction survey, during the Prosol I phase, 
the need for a quality system became evident. This was initially addressed 
through a Manual of Specifics then, during Prosol II, with a Quality Program 
(Qualité Solaire de Tunisie) developed by ANME and the Chambre Syndicale 
Nationale des Energies Renouvelables (CSnER). A quality certification 
system (called Qualisol), is now being gradually introduced for installers that 
want to operate under Prosol. For suppliers, instead, the Tunisian market is 
moving towards the European quality label for collectors (Solar Keymark), 
considered beneficial to foster the export of Tunisian products. Currently, 
only one Tunisian manufacturer is accredited as Keymark. At present, prod-
uct quality labels are not mandatory as yet, but this is envisaged. Source: 
ANME website, http://www.anme.nat.tn/; CSnER website, http://www.csner-
tn.com/fr/lien1.php?ID=15 http://www.csner-tn.com/fr/lien1.php?ID=15.
Risk events with high to very high impact whatever the probability of occurrence:
•	 SWH equipment defect, malfunctioning, or other faults: risks impacting both 
households and government’s expected output, addressed through certifica-
tion requirements, maintenance arrangements, and monitoring of system’s 
performance.
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a maintenance contract)42 and systems 
monitoring.
Thanks to such measures, cumulative equipment 
default rates observed under Prosol (2005-2010) cor-
responded to only 1% (ANME, 2012b).
ii. Debt-default and associated risks on 
benefits
Engaging banks by addressing their risk perception has 
been a key characteristic of the success of the financ-
ing mechanism (see Chapter 5). Ultimately, this allowed 
consumers to access credit at lower cost over longer 
repayment terms which in effect ensure market expan-
sion and potential sustainability.
We estimated the impact associated with debt-default 
risk by applying different rates of default to a Prosol 
loan’s cash flow stream. We noticed that, already with 
a hypothetical 5% annual default rate, Prosol would 
become an unprofitable business for banks, most likely 
prompting them to increase the interest rate charged. 
This would have a compounding effect by making the 
scheme less affordable, thus shrinking the demand for 
SWHs (see Appendix B).
This risk was significantly mitigated through a dou-
ble-level loan guarantee scheme embedded in the 
Program’s design: 
•	 third-party loan debt collector: the state-
owned utility STEG collects loan repayments 
through  electricity bills and may suspend elec-
tricity supply in case of delay/default; and
•	 third-party loan guarantor: suppliers initially 
(Prosol I) and then STEG (Prosol II).
It is noteworthy to highlight here that the role of suppli-
ers as guarantors in Prosol I put the overall supply chain 
at risk, as most of these firms were generally small 
family-owned businesses with limited ability to take on 
debt on their balance sheet. Acting on suppliers’ and 
banks’ complaints, ANME and UNEP with the launch of 
Prosol II, shifted the risk to an actor more suited to bear 
it, STEG.
42  To foster maintenance intervention and strengthen after-sale service, ANME 
introduced a maintenance contract, for an annual cost of USD 38 (TND 
50). A survey launched by ANME in 2009 highlighted the fact that only 
40% of the contacted households had signed an agreement for periodic 
maintenance (ANME, 2009). ANME has recently (2011) proposed to make 
maintenance mandatory to ensure SWHs functionality. ANME’s proposal 
has fostered competition in the after-sales service, with installers currently 
offering price-competitive maintenance contracts.
(3) Risk allocation
The Program design features altered the share of 
risks allocated to the various parties (along the three 
main dimensions we mentioned above). We represent 
these effects in a dynamic risk allocation matrix which 
illustrates how risks are allocated among the different 
stakeholders involved in the Prosol mechanism, and the 
evolution occurred from the first to the second phase 
(Figure 5).43 
Local and external public stakeholders are best placed 
to bear policy risks that reside within the public 
sphere. The GoT and ANME on one hand, and UNEP 
and MATTM on the other, necessarily bear the Program 
development risks (Prosol I), highlighting the particu-
lar role of bilateral aid.44 Lessons learnt from previous 
experiences and reliance on an expert partner like UNEP 
reduce the probability of failure. 
Public (ANME) and private entities (suppliers/install-
ers) share procurement and technology risks, the 
former through the setting of compliance standards and 
accreditation criteria, the latter (the suppliers) bearing 
the responsibility of the effective functioning of the 
individual installations.
The role of the state-owned utility STEG is a key 
element of the banks’ risk mitigation strategy. As 
previously discussed, by removing debt default risks 
from suppliers in Prosol II and with enforcement powers 
to suspend services to defaulting households, STEG 
relieves the banks of a risk they are not willing of 
bearing, and shifts the risk of non repayment from 
banks to households.
Under Prosol II there are also some delivery and price 
risks associated with the issuance of CERs to be men-
tioned. Local public entities that intend to benefit from 
CER revenues assume this risk, which is presumably 
shared with the buyer (Orbeo) by the means of an 
Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA).45
43 Risk allocations are colored according to some measure of ‘magnitude 
of risk’ times the ‘likelihood of risk’: ‘very high’ in red, ‘high’ in orange, 
‘moderate’ in light orange and ‘low’ in yellow. While we acknowledge the 
subjectivity of this approach, we deem it useful to provide a straightforward 
overview on the risks at stake and who bears them. A more detailed matrix 
is presented in Appendix C.
44 For instance, with regard to Prosol Tertiary (discussed in Chapter 6), delays 
in setting up the Program and in the funds stream postponed the take off 
of the initiative, putting off the participation of some stakeholders (ANME, 
2012b).
45 Confidentiality issues over the ERPA prevent us from properly characterizing 
and allocating CER-related risks.
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There is an overall evidence of a balanced risk alloca-
tion under which risks are allocated to the stakeholder 
more suited to bear them: public entities retain those 
Figure 5. Risk allocation matrices for Prosol I and Prosol II, organized by stakeholders (rows) and risk categories (columns).
Note: Specific risks are displayed in each square. Prosol II’s relatively lower risk profile reflects learning-by-doing from Prosol I, especially among policymakers 
and local entities, and technology providers. *In Prosol II there are also CER-related risks, which are supposedly managed through an ERPA with the CER buyer, 
ORBEO. Confidentiality issues prevent us from properly characterizing and allocating such risks. Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference 
section).
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that private ones are not capable of or willing to take, 
notably, the risk of default.
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5. What can a finance 
mechanism do?
This section analyzes in detail the two most striking 
aspects of Prosol:
•	 first, the ability of the Program to indirectly 
displace fossil fuel subsidies by shifting demand 
patterns, ultimately benefiting the public 
budget; and
•	 second, how targeted capacity-building and 
risk allocation promoted profitable engagement 
by local commercial banks and increased the 
volume of capital available for investments in 
SWH.
FOCUS 1 – Displacing fossil fuel subsidy 
through indirect means
 • Prosol is a successful example of how shifting 
end-users demand from conventional 
fuel-based technologies to green ones can 
indirectly reduce costly and inefficient fossil 
fuels subsidies;
 • To fully exploit the potential of renewable 
energies, Prosol-like initiatives need to be 
coordinated with reforms to the fossil fuels 
subsidy framework. 
chronic deficit in its energy balance, due to growing 
demand and reduced energy production patterns;46 the 
country has been a net importer of energy since 2001. 
During the 2005-2008 net imports averaged about 
15%, rising to an average 53% when oil products only 
are considered, 76% for LPG alone (PlanBleu, 2011; 
INS, 2010). The economic consequences of this cir-
cumstance have worsened with the outbreak of soaring 
international energy prices.
In Tunisia all energy products are directly or indirectly 
subsidized. According to local sources, LPG, which is 
widely used for water-heating, is subsidized at roughly 
50% of its value, natural gas at 60% and electricity at 
40%.47
Petroleum-related subsidies accounted for approxi-
mately USD 0.3 billion (TND 0.4 billion), or 1% of 
national GDP, in 2008 (IMF, 2008).48 This is a burden 
on the public budget that seems unsustainable in the 
long run, particularly when expected trends in oil prices 
are considered (IEA, 2011). In addition, fuel subsi-
dies represent a major obstacle to the deployment of 
renewable energy technologies, adding a competitive-
ness burden to technologies already distinguished by 
relatively higher prices, and in open contrast with the 
Government’s policy objectives (Law 82/2005).  
Nevertheless, subsidies have always been a highly 
politicized issue. Social welfare and political-economic 
objectives are called in as the rationale behind fossil fuel 
subsidies, which are seen as instruments to alleviate 
46 In 2005, Tunisia produced approximately 75,000 bbl/d of crude oil, which 
represents a 37% decline from Tunisia’s peak output of 120,000 bbl/d over 
the 1982-1984 period (INS, 2010). 
47 Electricity is subsidized indirectly through the natural gas used to generate 
it, which is sold by the Government to STEG at administered prices. It is 
then subsidized directly by the Government to the STEG to equilibrate its 
financial balance (MED-EMIP, 2010; MIEPME, 2012)
48 The level of subsidy reported by IMF (2008) is here compared to the 2008 
Tunisian GDP as per IMF (2012). RCREEE (2010) reports that USD 1.2 billion 
(EUR 0.9 billion) of country’s resources served energy-products subsidies in 
2007, approximately 4% of the country’s GDP in that year (Panbleu, 2011).
OECD (2012b) reports that fossil fuel consumption subsidies in 37 develop-
ing and emerging countries amounted to USD 409 billion in 2010; fossil fuel 
consumption and production subsidies in 24 OECD countries accounted for 
approximately USD 45-75 billion per annum between 2005 and 2011.  At the 
global level, it is estimated that fossil fuel subsidies account for around 1% 
of the world’s GDP each year (Lang et al., 2010). In 2009, at the G-20 meet-
ing held in Pittsburgh (USA) the leaders of the world’s largest economies 
encourage all countries ‘to phase out and rationalize over the medium term 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies’, blaming them for encouraging wasteful 
consumption, impede investment in clean energy sources and hampering 
global effort to deal with climate change (G20 Leaders Statement, 2009).
We consider the influence of a Program aimed to 
enhance the deployment of renewable energies on 
existing policies, specifically, on the energy subsidies-
framework. We first consider the fossil fuel subsidies 
context in Tunisia, their impacts on the overall economy, 
and the efforts in place to address what is often con-
sidered a difficult political and social issue. We then 
examine how Prosol – whose results incentivize the 
Government to counterbalance the market distortions 
generated by fossil fuel subsidies through a legislative 
act – indirectly contributed to shift end-users demand 
and, hence, displace a heavily subsidized fuel such as 
LPG. Then, we conclude with what we believe are the 
additional steps required to strengthen policy action 
and promote more incisive subsidies reform. 
Fossil fuel subsidies in Tunisia: a burden for 
public finances and a ‘brake’ on green growth
The energy context in Tunisia is characterized by a 
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energy poverty.49 Governments are cautious about 
altering such a socially entrenched benefit, and in 
general prefer to maintain the status quo.50 
In Tunisia, the level of subsidization has long been 
defined through the setting of end-users’ prices 
artificially lower than the market value for fuel. In 
January 2009, as crude oil prices peaked, the Tunisian 
Government established an automatic adjustment 
mechanism for domestic hydrocarbon prices. According 
to such a mechanism, petroleum products are adjusted 
by an a priori fixed amount when the international price 
of Brent remains at least USD 10 higher than a pre-
defined threshold for three consecutive months. This 
tool – which was considered as an intermediate step to 
move towards a liberalized market – has been only par-
tially enforced and, in the midst of the recent political 
turmoil, temporarily set aside (ADB et al., 2011; ANME, 
2012b).51
Displacing LPG subsidies by promoting green 
technologies with Prosol 
In the challenging and complex context of fossil-fuel 
energy reforms, the Prosol Program represents a suc-
cessful example of how the inability to directly phase 
out fuel subsidies can be addressed indirectly by shift-
ing demand preferences. 
Prosol, in fact, prompted the Government to mandate 
by law, for the first time in Tunisia, a counterbalanc-
ing subsidy for REs, leading to a partial revision of the 
country’s energy subsidization system. Despite increas-
ing the overall State influence in the energy econom-
ics, this intervention actually reduced the total public 
fund disbursement, as detailed below. UNEP, as well 
as the country’s energy and economic contingency, 
did play a critical role on this regard, by showing to the 
Government the financial benefits of Programs such as 
Prosol on LPG subsidy displacement. 
49 Nevertheless, several institutions and researchers disagree with the notion 
that fuel subsidies are an effective instrument for poverty alleviation, argu-
ing that it rather tends to favor middle-income classes. In fact, IEA (2011) 
reports that only 8% of the USD 409 billion spent on fossil fuel subsidies in 
2010 was distributed to the poorest 20% of the population (IEA, 2011; GBE, 
2012). 
50 Tunisia is not new to social unrest episodes following reform attempts, e.g., 
in 1983 and 1984. 
51 The threshold price of Brent was initially set at USD 52 per barrel then, in 
early 2010, was increased to USD 60 per barrel. The a priori amount was 
fixed at TND 200 millimes (USD 130 cents) for LPG bottles of 13 Kg. The 
latest price adjustment undertaken with this mechanism took place on Feb-
ruary 21, 2010 (Tunisian Ministry of Industry and Technology, http://www.
industrie.gov.tn/fr/directdoc.asp?docid=281; GIZ, 2010; 2011).
Our analysis focuses on LPG subsidies only because, 
with around 70% of the market share, LPG-fired water 
heaters represent the most direct alternative to SWHs 
in the Tunisian residential market (STEG, 2010). A 
general lack of transparency about fossil fuel subsi-
dies and local prices severely limits the availability of 
accurate data (GTZ, 2010) and affects both external 
analysis and local institutions’ ability to understand the 
real economic impacts associated with subsidy policies 
and ultimately undermine potential reforms initia-
tives. As a consequence, we estimated the level of LPG 
subsidy granted to end-users by employing a method-
ology based on the IEA’s price-gap approach,52 which 
compares the reference price of LPG – corresponding to 
its full cost of import and supply – to the end-user price 
set by the Tunisian Government for the 13 kg LPG bottle, 
the most widely used in the residential sector for water 
heating needs (STEG, 2010). 
Our analysis reveals an average subsidization rate 
of 55% for LPG between 2005 and 2010, roughly in 
line with stakeholders’ reported figures. During this 
time frame the level of subsidies increased, peaking at 
60% in 2010 (INS, 2010), mainly owing to the Tunisian 
authorities intention to quell protest in the aftermath of 
the ‘Arab Spring.’ 
Indeed, the Government adjusted end-user prices for 
LPG bottles used in the residential sector by only 5% a 
year (less than 2% in the last 3 years) – a much lower 
increase than the annual average 11% growth rate that 
occurred in actual cost of LPG (INS, 2012). 
Based on these rates of subsidization for LPG, we 
estimate that a total of USD 15.2 million of subsidy 
savings accrued to the GoT in the period 2005-
2010, corresponding to more than half of the financial 
support it granted to the Program in the same period,53 
or USD 101 million if we include benefits generated 
during the expected life span of SWHs.54 In this case, 
fossil fuel subsidy savings are not only able to cover all 
52 The price-gap approach is the most commonly applied methodology for 
quantifying consumption subsidies. For additional information see the IEA 
website, http://www.iea.org/weo/methodology_sub.asp. This approach 
presents both advantages and limitations; Koplow (2009) provides a 
detailed discussion in this regard. Due to data unavailability, not all the 
parameters adopted by the IEA’s methodology were included e.g., the price 
of butane was not adjusted for potential quality differences. See Appendix A 
for details on the methodology applied. 
53 We apply the rates of subsidization for LPG to the substituted LPG boilers 
(identified based on their market share in the water heater market). See 
Appendix A.
54 Estimate based on a BAU scenario assuming LPG end-user prices adjusted 
by the GoT at the same rate observed in the past 5 years (5.01%).
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Government’s plan to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 
2017 is to be achieved. This goal implies, for the resi-
dential sector, a yearly 20% adjustment of end-user 
prices for LPG (13 kg LPG bottle).58 This will be chal-
lenging for the country’s institutions, especially in the 
current political context and particularly as end-user 
LPG prices have remained relatively unchanged over 
the past three years relative to the cost of imported fuel 
and that previous reform attempts have not been suc-
cessful.59 However, the unquestionable environmental 
and proven potential for significant financial benefits 
generated by initiatives such as Prosol should provide 
the necessary support for decisions despite initial 
unpopularity.
58 20% is computed as the annual increase in end-user prices required to 
guarantee the gradual extinction of subsidy by 2017.
59 The GoT intention to progressively reduce fuel price subsidies by 2011 was 
also stated in the XI Development Plan (2007-2011) (IMF, 2008; RCREEE, 
2010). A year after the ‘Arab Spring’, and few months after its first free 
elections, Tunisia’s new Government has not as yet attempted to reform the 
distorted energy market given the widespread discontent related to living 
standards. In the aftermath of the revolution, reform attempts are going to 
be even harder because in 2010, in order to quell protests, the overall level 
of subsidies for fuel, food staples and transport was increased (AfDB, OECD, 
UNDP, UNECA, 2011; MIEPME, 2012).
Government costs, but deliver a significant return on its 
upfront financial commitment.55 Annual LPG subsidy 
savings today correspond to around 2% of all subsidies 
allocated to oil products every year in the country, but 
their share is destined to rise given the Government’s 
ambitious deployment objectives under Prosol.56
Options to move from an indirect to a direct 
approach to displace LPG subsidies
Our findings suggest that to date, Prosol has been 
mostly successful in indirectly displacing LPG subsidies 
in Tunisia and improving public finances.
We have shown earlier that from a households’ per-
spective the incentivizing measures of Prosol sig-
nificantly improved returns and payback of the SWH 
investment. However, the costs are still comparatively 
high and prevent such an investment from being appeal-
ing from a purely financial standpoint. This is mainly due 
to the LPG subsidies barrier.
Financial simulations show that in a ‘free-market’ 
scenario where supporting mechanisms for either 
fossil fuels or SWHs are removed,57 RE technology is a 
superior investment option. In this scenario, while the 
LCOE of an average SWH rises from the current USD 
8 cents/kWh to 9.7, the LPG-fuelled option would in 
fact experience a much larger increase: from current 
USD 7.8 cents/kWh to 14.8. Under these conditions 
payback related to an investment in SWHs in alternative 
to an LPG-based system decreases from the 10-11 years 
when both systems are incentivized, to 7 years, reveal-
ing an improvement in its competitiveness. Furthermore 
it shows that, despite the enhancements observed in 
the energy subsidization framework of Tunisia, overall 
public support today still favors more fossil fuels over 
renewable energies. 
Alongside the implementation of REs Programs such as 
Prosol and the Tunisian Solar Plan, a clear reevaluation 
of the level of fuel subsidization will be essential if the 
55 This return could be used to refinance the Program through the FNME in 
a sustainable way. The Fund is currently replenished via a registration tax 
on new vehicles, which could discourage the purchase of cleaner and more 
efficient models (Law 82/2005).
56 This is estimated as the ratio of the subsidies displaced by Prosol consider-
ing all installations up to 2010 and assuming that the amount of subsidies 
distributed to oil products remains close to the level reported for 2008 (IMF, 
2008).
57 Both subsidy mechanisms and improved loan conditions are not accounted 
as measures of support for SWHs, and competition is restored to ‘free-
market’ conditions by increasing the LPG end-user price for an approximated 
55%, the level of LPG subsidies observed in the period 2005-2010.
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Addressing banks’ (lack of) confidence 
According to UNEP (2012a and 2012b), the initial 
Program coordinator and implementing agency, Tunisia 
presented the key features to successfully engage 
banks, namely:
•	 the availability of a commercially viable RE 
technology in the country (notwithstanding the 
very generous subsidies to fossil fuels), with the 
potential to support a local supply chain;
•	 The existence of a functioning local banking 
sector and a sufficient bancarization 
 rate of the population; and
•	 the willingness of national authorities to support 
the initiative by addressing institutional barriers 
for market development.
Despite the evident potential, the initial interest of 
commercial banks in SWH financing was very limited.  
Much of this derived from the poor awareness among 
local financial institutions, which were experiencing high 
rates of defaults and were still unfamiliar with financing 
RE investments, that a low-risk and profitable market 
existed both in terms of achievable loan volumes and 
of loan quality. Besides, in the early 2000s consumer 
credit was still a novelty in Tunisia’s financial market, 
despite remarkable growth rates (see Box 1). In this 
phase, it proved critical to have the availability and use 
of international donor resources to finance capacity-
building among political and financial institutions.
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Figure 6. Average interest rate in the Tunisian consumer loans market
Note: The interest rate charged on Prosol loans reported here is the rate received by banks, hence 
gross of the interest rate subsidies. Source: CPI elaboration based on Central Bank of Tunisia, 
Tunisie Valeurs.
 • Creating awareness of the market potential 
when engaging banks is crucial to channel 
credit through the banking sector and 
increase the available capital for SWH market.
 • STEG’s multiple role as debt servicer, 
repayment enforcer and debt guarantor 
greatly reduced risks perceived by banks, and 
facilitated a significant reduction of interest 
rates charged to end-users.
 • The near-zero default rate of Prosol loans 
has made the initiative profitable for banks 
despite the lower interest rate charged, and 
more affordable for households, improving the 
prospects for the mechanism to be replicated.
FOCUS 2 – Incentivizing the private sector 
involvement
In this section we consider if a financing mechanism can 
incentivize private investor involvement. Transforming 
the formerly cash-only SWH market into a cash-and-
credit one has undoubtedly been a key success factor 
for Prosol, allowing a much higher market uptake 
compared with previous initiatives. Channelling credit 
through the local banking sector increased 
the pool of private capital available for 
investments and helped to attract almost 
USD 5 dollars of private capital for each 
dollar of public finance invested.60
We consider the different roles played by 
public stakeholders and explore issues 
and challenges they each had to overcome 
in the final risk allocation arrangements, 
emphasizing the significant effect of credit 
risk mitigation on banks’ profitability and 
loan affordability. Finally, we estimate the 
Program’s profitability and, more impor-
tantly, the overall SWH market potential 
from a banker’s perspective, in order to 
assess the foreseeable long-term interest 
from local financial institutions.
60 See Figure 3. ’Program Contributions by Stakeholder’ in Chapter 3: Prosol 
investment, returns and profitability.
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To incentivize market uptake and rapidly reach a criti-
cal mass of loans for the banks, the Program’s initial 
sponsors granted an interest rate subsidy for borrowers 
to abate the cost of financing for the first 18 months of 
Prosol.
While this did encourage access to credit for house-
holds, we believe that, in the case of Prosol, the 
creation of the credit market was mostly due to the 
involvement of STEG, the state-owned utility, as debt 
servicer, repayment enforcer and, for Prosol II, as debt 
guarantor. Indeed, STEG’s role as debt servicer made 
the initiative almost costless for banks since credit 
checks, paperwork and repayment collection were all 
performed by STEG’s personnel and imposed no burden 
on banks’ resources.
More importantly, having STEG as repayment enforcer 
(that is, directly linking the default on the debt to the 
suspension of electricity and gas services) greatly 
decreased the perceived default risk of Prosol loans 
and prompted banks to offer credit at an interest rate 
about 50% lower than the market rate (see Figure 6). 
The near-zero default rates (UNEP, 2012a; STEG, 2012) 
realized in Prosol demonstrate how effective this tactic 
proved to be, but also expose, we believe, a political 
vulnerability of the Program.
Critically, while providing households with a cheaper 
financing source, this strong mitigation of credit risk had 
also a clear positive impact on banks’ financial returns: 
Figure 7 compares realized cash flows originated by 
consumer credit loans at market-level 
interest (Touhami, 2011) and default 
rates, with those of a typical Prosol 
loan, whose interest rates are halved 
but whose resulting cash flows are 
more than 10% higher.
Regarding the debt guarantees, the 
initial setting with the supplier taking 
the credit on its balance sheet directly 
(hence providing a direct debt guar-
antee to the household) proved too 
onerous for the supplier and proce-
durally too complex. This ineffec-
tive and burdensome guarantee was 
then replaced by a direct and more 
effective one from STEG, decreasing 
further banks’ perceived risk.
Affordable consumer credit
Looking at the interest rates generally 
charged on consumer loans over the 
years highlights Prosol’s success in providing Tunisian 
customers with more affordable financing for the 
purchase of SWHs. Compared with an average 9.7% 
interest rate charged on generic consumer loans (500 
basis points over banks’ blended funding costs)61, over 
the 2005-2010 period, Prosol loans were offered at an 
average rate of 6.3% (of which the customer paid only 
a fraction during the first 18 months of the Program), or 
280 basis points over banks’ cost of resources.
On this point, we stress once again how crucial the 
double-layered guarantee provided by STEG (as debt 
repayment enforcer and loan guarantor) and the result-
ing extremely low level of loan defaults have been in 
developing banks’ interest for Prosol and the availability 
of affordable credit conditions.
Renewable energy markets profitability 
potential 
In Prosol, commercial bank revenues arose mainly from 
the interest payments on the loans. In contrast with 
their usual practice banks did not charge any commis-
sions on loans’ processing, and conversely, nor did they 
sustain any significant direct costs62 other than training 
staff to manage these new products and the opportu-
nity cost of committing capital to finance the purchase 
61 Central Bank of Tunisia (2006-2011 and 2012).
62 Loan applications were processed directly by suppliers of SWHs with STEG, 
and the debt itself was then serviced by STEG by embedding loan repay-
ments in the electricity bills payment system.
Figure 7. Comparison of hypothetical cash flows between a generic consumer loan 
and a Prosol loan
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loan. General assumptions include a 7% interest rate and 1% default rate for the Prosol loan, and a 
13% interest rate and 15% default rate for the generic consumer loan.
Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference section). 
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of SWH instead of 
other potential uses.
Given these con-
siderations, we 
examine the prof-
itability of the 
Program for the 
banks in terms of 
the contribution of 
interest revenues 
to banks’ top line, 
that is, the contribution of Prosol’s loan interest flows 
to the overall gross revenues from all lending activi-
ties (excluding commissions) that banks report annu-
ally. We acknowledge, but do not quantify, issues of 
constraints to capital available for lending, opportunity 
costs of forfeited interest, or different default rates 
among products. However, we assume that a banker 
could reasonably expect to more than recoup the 
forfeited revenues associated with lower interest rates 
charged on loans within Prosol given their near-zero 
default rate, compared with the higher default rate of 
traditional consumer loans (see Figure 7 for a simple 
simulation exercise, comparing the revenues from a 
loan within Prosol to a generic loan of equal nominal 
value, but different default rate). We assess that this 
alone would narrow the decision on whether or not 
commit capital to the initiative.
We estimate that, in total, the three banks contributed 
about USD 60 million to Prosol.63 Amen Bank and UBCI 
together loaned USD 7.3 million in Prosol I, while Attijari 
Bank made loans for USD 52.5 million in Prosol II. 
Compared to banks’ loan portfolios, the value of these 
loans was almost negligible for Amen Bank and UBCI, 
but more relevant for Attijari which steadily increased 
the value of loans to Prosol II from 0.7% to almost 2% 
of its whole loan portfolio, notwithstanding an average 
yearly growth rate of 15% of the bank’s balance sheet. 
In terms of gross revenues from Prosol, we estimate 
that banks collectively earned around USD 7.4 
million64 between 2005 and 2010, with a growing and 
appreciable contribution to top line for Attijari Bank in 
particular.
Finally, we return to the issue of financial institutions’ 
awareness of the profitability potential of renew-
able energy markets as the strongest barrier to their 
63 Figure adjusted for inflation rate of 3.68%. For Prosol I, total loans granted 
by Amen Bank and UBCI have been estimated from their overall market 
share (See the Box 1 on the Tunisian Banking Sector).
64 Adjusted for inflation rate of 3.68% (IMF, 2011).
involvement, especially for initiatives dedicated to 
small scale financing. If we consider the Tunisian 
Government’s objective of SWHs additional installed 
capacity of more than 400,000 m2 by 2016 for the resi-
dential sector alone, the loan volume to meet the need 
would amount to approximately USD 92.5 million65 
over 5 years, with the potential to generate around USD 
1.5-1.7 million in annual net interest proceeds.66 While 
not insignificant, the likelihood of having to share these 
revenues among several financial institutions at the 
same time would render the prospect less attractive, 
hence making the challenge of scaling up the Program 
to different technologies (such as solar PV) or to new 
customers (that is service and commercial sectors) a 
significant issue, with new hurdles and barriers to be 
addressed (see the following Chapter on scalability 
and replicability of Prosol). To this extent the role of 
the banking sector would need to be assessed within 
the broader context of the Tunisian Solar Plan, which 
aims to mobilize almost USD 2 billion of private funds 
for investments in a wide range of RE technologies and 
programs.67 
65 STEG (2012): the loan volume implied by the Program’s target has been esti-
mated using unpublished projections by STEG of additional 110,000 credits 
with an average credit amount of USD 845, deriving from an additional 
80,000 m2 installed annually.
66  CPI elaborations, assuming a blended cost of resources for banks of 3.5% 
(CBT, 2006-2011).
67  Source: http://www.pavingtheway-msp.eu/fileadmin/paving-the-way/
Tunisa.pdf. 
PROSOL (2005-2010)
INTEREST 
PROCEEDS (IN 
USD 2005 MLN)
AVERAGE 
CONTRIBUTION 
TO TOP LINE
CAPITAL 
COMMITTED (IN 
USD 2005 MLN)
AVERAGE SHARE 
OF OUTSTANDING 
LOANS
AMEN BANk (PRosol I) 0.9 0.2% 4.7 0.2%
UBCI (PRosol I) 0.5 0.2% 2.6 0.2%
ATTIjARI BANk (PRosol II) 5.9 1.4% 52.5 1.2%
Table 5. Prosol Profitability for Banks from 2005 to 2010.
Source: CPI elaboration based on Banks’ Annual Reports (see Reference section). 
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Box 1. Tunisian Banking Sector 
When the Prosol Program was launched in 2005, the Tunisian banking sector was in the midst of radical 
changes spurred by the central Government’s decision to liberalize the sector, improve its profitability and 
competitiveness, and address the quality of banks’ portfolios. These reforms, aimed to improve access to 
financing for economic players (OECD, 2012a), actually enabled a greater participation of private capital 
(both domestic and foreign) in the market. They also triggered the privatization of two large state-controlled 
institutions: the Union International de Banque bought by Société Générale in 2002, and, in 2005, Banque du 
Sud sold to AttjiariWafa Bank of Morocco and Banco Santander of Spain, leading to the formation of Attijari 
Bank of Tunisie.
Notwithstanding these reforms, the loan market – whose overall size almost doubled from USD 16.7 billion 
in 2005 to USD 29.6 billion in 2010 – remains significantly dominated by State-controlled banks, which 
represented 49% of the sector in 2005 and 38% in 2010.
The Prosol Residential financing mechanism was centered on consumer loans,1 introduced in the market 
in 1999 as banks began to focus more on retail customers. In 2004, four years after their introduction, the 
volume of consumer loans was already 35% of the overall retail banking activity, and 5% of the total amount 
of outstanding loans in the Tunisian economy (Tunisie Valeurs, 2005). Three years later, in 2007 when Prosol 
Residential II was launched, the overall size of the retail banking market had doubled to USD 4.8 billion and 
the share of consumer loans had exceeded 40%.
As noted, over the last decade banks have struggled to address portfolios’ poor quality compounded by a high 
incidence of non-performing loans (NPL) and a general low rate of provisioning.2 To deal with this, authorities 
amended banking regulations in 2006 to mandate a provisioning rate of 70% and set a maximum level of 
NPL of 15%, to be met by 2009 (IMF/WB, 2006). On one hand, this helped to improve the quality of banks’ 
portfolios (see Figure 8) but, on the other, it very likely increased their risk aversion and hesitation to enter 
new markets such as RE.
1 Due to the supplier’s guarantee, Prosol I was officially reported as a commercial loan despite being designed for the end-user consumer.
2 Provisioning ratio measures the proportion of total non-performing loans against which a provision charge has been made. The higher the number the 
more conservative the bank has been in charging provisions against profit.
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Figure 8. Banks’ loan portfolio quality: percentage of non-performing loans in 2004 and 2010
Source: CPI elaboration based on Maxula Bourse, 2010.
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6. Is Prosol scalable and 
replicable?
The success of Prosol Residential and the simplicity and 
transparency of its financial mechanism has generated 
a strong incentive to scale up the Program to accommo-
date other audiences and technologies.
Building on this success, ANME with the support of 
UNEP and MATTM, promoted two other initiatives that 
extended the financing mechanism from households to 
commercial and more energy intensive activities. Prosol 
Tertiary, targeting the services sector and hotels in par-
ticular, was launched in 2007. Prosol Industry, targeting 
the textile, chemical and food industries, was launched 
in 2009 but, is still in its pilot phase. 
On the technology side, the mechanism has also been 
applied to small-scale photovoltaic systems in the resi-
dential sector, with the launch in 2010 of Prosol Elec.
Each of these programs shares the essential Prosol 
structure, providing subsidies on capital costs, interest 
rates and, also for maintenance costs subsidies. The 
most important difference is the absence of STEG, or an 
equivalent entity, in the Programs aimed at the business 
sector.
Table 6 below summarizes the key features of the 
financing mechanisms designed for the each initiative.
Launched at the same time as Prosol II Residential, 
Prosol Tertiary aimed to install 45,000 m2 of panels by 
2009, targeting between 80 and 100 hotels out the 850 
operating in the sector, which had an estimated overall 
potential of 170,000 m2 of panels. With an expected 
need of 6,000,000 m3/year of hot water and 28,000 
Toe/year in total energy demand, of which 60% could 
be saved by investing in SWHs (Marrouki, 2009), the 
hotel sector was deemed an ideal target for Prosol. Due 
to the sector’s higher sensitivity to financial metrics 
compared with households,68 aggregate incentives on 
68 Consultations between hoteliers and ANME reported that payback times 
greater than 3.5 years are deemed unacceptable for hotels for investments 
capital costs exceeded those for Prosol Residential. 
Notwithstanding this difference, at the end of 2011, 
fewer than 25 hotels participated in the scheme, and 
total installations hovered at around 3,000 m2. 
Procedural delays in the set-up phase, STEG’s absence 
as debt servicer and guarantor, and the reported pre-
carious financial outlook for the tourism sector, damp-
ened the interest of private commercial banks. In fact, 
the state-owned STB was the only financial institution 
to offer loans at abated interest rates (TMM+2%, of 
which 2% was subsidized by MATTM). Interestingly, 
MATTM reports that the interest rate subsidy facility 
is yet to be tapped, implying that all installations so far 
have been financed either by cash or by existing (and 
unsubsidized) credit lines between hotels and banks. 
We attribute this lack of engagement by the hotel sector 
to several converging factors: 
•	 an unfavorable economic environment for the 
sector; 
•	 the diffusion among hoteliers of the tenant 
business model that disincentivizes  capital 
investments; and 
•	 their high rates of default that, very likely, 
make access to credit more onerous for these 
borrowers. 
More importantly, it appears that the significant sub-
sidization of fossil fuels again represents the strongest 
hurdle to investments in SWHs. Indeed, capital cost and 
interest rate subsidies manage to reduce the payback 
time to an acceptable level only when the SWH is 
considered as alternative to LPG-fired system (payback 
time down from 6 to 3.5 years).69 Crucially, payback 
times are still too long if the alternative is natural gas 
(down from 13.5 years to over 10.5 with incentives)70 
such as SWH ones (ANME, 2011b).
69 A complete replacement is, however, not possible given the need to keep the 
fuel fired WH as back-up, complementary system.
70 Estimates based on financial modeling calculating the payback of the project 
before and after the supporting measures under Prosol Tertiary. Revenues 
are derived from the substitution of existing LPG / natural gas water heating 
 • Scalability is not a trivial problem. It is necessary to embed in Program’s design multiple building blocks 
able to address the technology and audience-specific issues preventing widespread deployment of REs. 
 • Fossil fuel subsidies may represent a significant barrier to scaling up and replicating the Program in 
Tunisia and beyond.
 • The role played by STEG may be difficult to replicate. Alternative models will need to be developed to 
provide incentives to commercial investors and minimize default risks.
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which is becoming increasingly widely distributed in the 
country. In fact, while only one in every seven house-
holds has access to natural gas, more than half of the 
hotels use it as the primary energy source for thermal 
needs, significantly reducing the potential market for 
SWHs (at the current level of gas subsidization) to the 
third of the sector using LPG and electricity.
Prosol Elec and Prosol Industry were both launched just 
before the uprising of 2010, and are still in a pilot phase. 
Given these circumstances it is too early to properly 
evaluate their outcome. We only note that Prosol Elec 
targets a capacity of 15 MW installed by 2016 and has 
so far prompted the installation of 2 MW, experienc-
ing a particular rapid growth between December 2010 
and August 2011 (MATTM, 2011). Forty pre-feasibility 
studies and ten feasibility studies have been completed 
for Prosol Industry, and one pilot project carried out in 
the textile industry, but with only limited interest from 
commercial banks.
It would be difficult to replicate exactly the elements 
that made Prosol Residential successful. However, 
understanding what worked and what did not could 
assist the design and implementation of more effective 
systems with 55% efficiency. We assume an average cost per square meter 
of USD 565/m2 (TND 750/m2) for a SWH system with a productivity of 866 
kWh/m2, and a debt coverage of about 70% of investment cost with 5 years 
maturity. Investment depreciation are also computed in 5 years. Financial 
resources provided for feasibility studies are not included in the calculation. 
Figures and specific information presented in this paragraph were retrieved 
directly from stakeholders, particularly: ANME, UNEP, MATTM and Energie 
del Sole between January and March 2012.
interventions in other contexts, strengthening the use of 
public finance in the promotion of REs. In particular, we 
focus on whether Prosol’s strategy is replicable by con-
sidering if the financing mechanisms can be duplicated, 
and what other countries could learn from Tunisia’s 
example.
What worked in Prosol? 
The key building blocks that contributed to the success 
of Prosol Residential were:
•	 the engagement and strong commitment of 
national public authorities71 evident in the 
credible and stable support that bolstered  
investors’ confidence; 
•	 the involvement of the State utility STEG as 
guarantor and debt enforcer, which enhanced 
domestic financial institutions trust and resulted 
in lowered financing costs for residential 
end-user purchasers; 
•	 an appealing financial scheme using soft 
interest rates and longer repayment terms;
•	 the implementation of pervasive and focused 
awareness raising, communication and capacity 
building activities; and
•	 a stakeholder-tailored approach that involved all 
relevant actors in the development of the SWH 
71 The institutional capacity of an experienced ’Program leader’ (ANME) 
entrusted of the overall management and implementation of the mechanism 
also played a key role.
BARRIERS TO BE ADDRESSED CAPITAL SUBSIDY INTEREST RATE SUBSIDY
MAINTENANCE 
SUBSIDY
LOAN 
REPAYMENT IN 
STEG BILLS
PROSOL 
TERTIARY
• No direct ownership of the 
Hotel facility
• High rates of debt defaults
• SWH competitiveness vs. 
subsidized natural gas
50% feasibility study costs 
10% capital cost by MATTM 
30% by FNME
2% yearly by 
MATTM
Support in first 4 
years (circa 3% of 
inv. cost)
None
PROSOL 
INDUSTRY1
• SWH competitiveness vs. 
subsidized natural gas
• Lack of familiarity and 
skepticism on the technology 
100% feasibility study costs 
30% capital cost by MATTM
To be defined To be defined To be defined
PROSOL 
ELEC
• Lack of familiarity and 
skepticism on the technology
• High upfront costs
30% cap costs by FNME
10% cap costs by MATTM
Free inverter by STEG
Full abatement of 
IR costs
None
5-year credit line 
offered by Attijari 
Bank
Table 6. Prosol Tertiary, Industry and Elec: key features of the financing mechanisms. 
Source: CPI elaboration based on ANME website and direct communications. 
1   The financial mechanism of Prosol Industry is currently in a testing phase, hence its elements might be subject to several changes before the Program is launched 
in its final structure.
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market from national authorities to financial 
institutions, suppliers, installers and end-users.
We highlight that the administrative ease and minimal 
bureaucracy of the Prosol facility was made possible by 
STEG’s pre-existing infrastructure, which helped to build 
demand by lowering transaction costs.
What did not work in Prosol?
The ‘weakest’ aspects of the financing mechanism were:
•	 indirect lending and guarantees provided by 
‘financially fragile’ actors such as the provision 
of financing and guarantees by suppliers under 
Prosol I. These had the potential to undermine 
the Program and the industry value chain, if not 
promptly and properly addressed; and
•	 reliance on a single-financing institution (such 
as Attijari Bank in Prosol II) which can result in 
market distortions and potentially hamper the 
Program’s long-term sustainability.
We note that the monitoring, control, supervision, 
governance arrangements and skills developed for 
and within Prosol are evidence of an effective learn-
ing feedback-loop. The ‘weak aspects’ identified above 
were overcome during the lifetime of the interven-
tion: in Prosol II the debt guarantees were shifted from 
suppliers to STEG and, in Prosol III (forthcoming) the 
engagement of a larger number of commercial banks is 
envisioned.
In addition, it is worth noting that the role played by 
STEG – a pivotal element of Prosol Residential – limits 
the overall potential to scale-up the Program. Its par-
ticipation in the Tertiary or Industrial sector, in fact, was 
deemed inapplicable and undesirable by public authori-
ties. Moreover, in a liberalized energy market, the 
involvement of a STEG-equivalent might be difficult to 
secure or more limited, in the absence of a strong public 
mandate, as in the Tunisian case.
Against this background we ask: can Prosol be consid-
ered a ‘game changer’? How are the lessons learned 
from Prosol being applied in like programs? How are 
other countries promoting the uptake of SWHs? 
Building upon the experience developed with Prosol – as 
well from the other initiatives implemented in Morocco 
(Prosol) and Egypt (Egysol) within the MEDREP frame-
work – the Italian MATTM and UNEP (and other Prosol 
stakeholders) have had the opportunity to learn the 
lessons, and to build on them in subsequent climate 
finance interventions.
Disseminating and sharing such lessons will be essential 
to create a positive ‘multiplier effect’ and promote suc-
cessful replication.72
At the present stage, the SWH incentive Programs 
currently ongoing or under development in the MENA 
Region and the Balkans are assessing the feasibility 
and sustainability of Prosol’s features in these distinct 
contexts.73
The replicability of Prosol is dependent upon institu-
tional, regulatory, and economic as well as cultural reali-
ties, which will need to be adequately understood in the 
feasibility study phase.
For example, Tunisian experts have offered their knowl-
edge and capabilities to help improve a SWH mecha-
nism launched in Morocco in 2005 that has not been 
as successful as hoped.74 Discussions undertaken with 
stakeholders highlighted the following culprits:
•	 the lack of a capital cost subsidy intended to 
increase the competitiveness of SWHs versus 
the subsidized conventional alternative;
•	 the relatively lower experience (compared 
to ANME) of the Moroccan counterpart, the 
Center for Development of Renewable Energies 
(CDER) which led and implemented similar 
country-wide initiatives (UNEP, 2012a; .ANME, 
2012b, Eco-Ser, 2012).
More recent initiatives, such as those launched in 
Montenegro or currently under development in 
Macedonia, intend to replicate Prosol (UNEP-DTIE, 
2010). In particular, the design of the Macedonian 
Facility already in operation, replicates almost all of the 
Prosol building blocks (interest rate subsidy, aware-
ness-raising, capacity building, etc.) with the excep-
tion of a STEG-equivalent entity and the investment 
subsidy. Country-specific factors would appear to have 
prompted these decisions and these elements might be 
72 On this regard, it is worth noting the web knowledge management and 
dissemination tool developed by UNEP: www.solarthermalworld.org. 
Such web-based portal represents the primary contribution of UNEP to 
the GEF-funded Global Solar Water Heating Market Transformations and 
Strengthening Initiative (GSWH), which is aimed to inform the development 
and implementation of six-country Programs across Albania, Algeria, Chile, 
India, Lebanon, and Mexico. Like in the Tunisian experience, in fact, such 
initiatives are framed to address finance, awareness and information, skills, 
technology as well as policy and regulation, the most common barriers to 
the development of a SWH market. Source: http://www.solarthermalworld.
org/node/3301. 
73 See Appendix C for detailed information on those Programs.
74 It achieved the 20% circa of its stated target. See UNEP website, www.unep.
org. 
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reassessed at a second stage, given that the facility has 
only been operating for around a year. 
Is Prosol Residential scalable and 
replicable?   
Beyond challenges associated with specific contexts or 
target audiences, the major hurdle that the initiatives 
presented above aim to overcome is the initial capital 
cost of the equipment, which can be a barrier for both 
commercial and residential users. 
As the Tunisian experience prior to Prosol highlights, 
financial incentives alone are not sufficient to create a 
viable market on a long-term basis. Non-financial mea-
sures, including concerted awareness and commu-
nication campaigns, capacity-building activities and 
rigorous enforcement of quality standards, are fun-
damental ingredients of a ‘recipe for success’. These 
measures, however, are not meant to downplay the 
crucial importance of embedding incentive mechanisms 
in a coherent policy framework, taking into account 
audience and country-specific aspects.
A number of actions to establish enabling conditions 
are critical if the aim is to scaled-up and replicate the 
features of the Prosol financing mechanism. Notably:
•	 establish a conducive institutional and 
regulatory context (i.e., commitment of public 
authorities; stable and credible policy support; 
competence of implementing agencies);
•	 raise awareness amongst the target audience of 
the broad basket of benefits versus costs;
•	 engage the local Government to remove market 
distortions and take the role of the external 
donor(s) to bring forward the effects spurred 
from foreign aid money, leading the technology 
towards market independence (which has 
not occurred, for example, in the Moroccan 
experience discussed above);
•	 identify and implement a risk-sharing 
mechanism to increase/create incentives for 
local banks to invest in renewable energies;
•	 promote tailored capacity building measures to 
improve the ‘readiness’ of local financial institu-
tions and supply chain players. 
If a transformative activity has to support a ‘state 
change’ in the financing of REs technologies, it can be 
said that Prosol Residential did it. In fact, throughout its 
unique multi-stakeholder approach, it has been effective 
in addressing the multiple barriers that had previously 
prevented the wide-spread adoption of SWHs in the 
Tunisian market. It played a significant role to mobilise 
resources in the local context and ultimately, provides a 
successful example to inform similar initiatives.
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Box 2. How are SWHs financed in other countries? What other mechanisms are in place?
Different nations have used a wide array of policies and financial incentives to promote the uptake of SWHs:
 • capital-grants (subsidies) based on SWH collector-area or performance;
 • tax incentives;
 • third-party financing;
 • fee-for-service schemes;
 • market-based instruments (e.g. Renewable Energies Certificates – RECs);
 • mandatory policies.
Direct grants and subsidies are, to date, the most prevalent financing schemes used to promote SWHs 
uptake. Some countries, such as Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden have opted to subsidize SWHs as a 
function of the systems’ performance (Roulleau and Lloyd, 2008). Proxies to estimate such performances are 
essential to avoid potentially costly one-to-one monitoring of individual systems.
Fiscal measures incentives were, for instance, adopted by the Greek Government which set tax deductions to 
reduce the investment costs for households by around 30% (up to 2002) (GTZ, 2006).
Along with fiscal incentives, third-party financing in the form of soft loans or loan guarantees are less 
widespread instruments (Haselip et al., 2011) despite their success in the Tunisian experience. Soft loan 
arrangements have, for instance, been promoted in India where the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 
(MNRE) provides them through 34 financial institutions, with interest rates that vary from 2–5% according to 
the category of users. Interestingly, as with the Tunisian case, the interest subsidy attracted local banks to the 
financing of SWH systems (Tampier et al., 2006). 
The application of partial loan guarantee schemes for financing SWHs has been proposed, for instance, in the 
Caribbean Region with the aim of reducing commercial banks’ risks through partial (50-80%) credit and a 
sovereign risk guarantee. However, the scheme was not ultimately implemented as key parties pulled out and 
no alternatives could be found (Van den Akker, 2011).
SWH fee-for-service programs have been pilot-tested in the Caribbean and in Brazil (MNRE and REEEP, 2010; 
MERCADOS, 2010). Such schemes aim to integrate distributed generation in the energy mix of utilities, either 
via sale-of-energy1 or system leasing or rental2 arrangements, the two most common options.
A ‘fee-for-service’ mechanism, in the form of Energy Service Company (ESCO) model, has been deployed in 
South Africa,3 to stimulate large-scale deployment of SWHs. The company purchases, installs and operates 
the SWH at its own cost and retains ownership. SWHs can also be installed and maintained at households 
premises, always at the ESCO’s own cost (MNRE and REEEP, 2010; MERCADOS, 2010). This model is 
attractive because end-users do not bear any capital costs and, for them, the system is ‘hassle free’.  
Some countries have opted for market-based mechanism such as the Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs). 
Australia, for instance, is one of few that have introduced a specific REC for SWHs that can be used for 
compliance with its Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (SEA, 2007).4 
1 The sale-of-energy program – which is applicable to any water heater customer – relieves end-users from the capital investment for the SWH equip-
ment. The ownership of the system remains of the utility or of any other energy service provider that sells the energy generated to the customer at 
a rate lower than that of the conventional electricity. Energy sales can be structured as a “performance” contract or “shared savings” (Guiney et al., 
2006). 
2 The leased and rental option – common in the business sector – implies that the SWH are owned or financed by a third party (the utility or energy 
service provider), who will realize a tax benefit by depreciating the system while receiving a payment for the use of the SWH being leased. The end-
user’s payments, hence, cover the decreasing value of the equipment plus a margin for the leasing entity (Guiney et al., 2006).
3 SWH ESCO program in Pretoria. ESCOs models are best suited for larger institutional and commercial customers. The ESCO can sell e.g. via a fix-term 
lease or hire/purchase agreement or at a fixed-monthly fee. For additional information see MNRE and REEEP (2010); MERCADOS (2010).
4 RECs can be issued to SWH buyers themselves but, generally, they assign the right to a third-party and obtain a financial benefit in exchange (dis-
count or cash rebate). The number of RECs which a SWH systems is entitled to – generally ranging from 10 to 64 RECs – vary according to end-user’s 
location (postcode) and system type (MERCADOS, 2010; Roulleau and Lloyd, 2008).
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Mandatory policies for SWH deployment in new buildings, constructions restorations or refurbishments, in 
public as well as in private residences, are also in place in countries such as Israel, Spain and China as well as 
Tunisia (GTOR, 2005; MNRE and REEEP, 2010). 
More recently third-party Energy Purchase Agreements (EPAs) have emerged as SWHs financing 
instruments. This model is similar to a Power Purchase Agreement (PPAs) as end-users acquire the energy 
needed to heat the water for a 10-20 year period from the EPA provider. The EPA installs, owns, and operates 
the system. There are no upfront and maintenance costs or operational risk for the end-users.
Sometimes, high penetration rates of SWH in the domestic sector or other sectors can be achieved without 
any financial incentives or government Program. This is the case of Palestine where – in contrast with its 
significant reliance on donor funding for energy projects – SWHs were spontaneously adopted by households, 
72% of which opted for them for their water heating needs. This significant performance has been driven 
by market forces alone as the prevailing prices of conventional energy sources make solar heating a cost-
effective option5 (Consortium MVVdecon/ENEA/RTE-I/Sonelgaz/Terna, 2011).
5 The payback period of a basic SWH system compared to an electric one is said to be less than 2 years.
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7. Conclusion
The Prosol Tunisia financing program promoted the 
installation of more than 119,000 SWH systems, total-
ing around 355,350 m2 of collector area over the time-
frame analyzed (2005-2010). With a fivefold increased 
in annual deployment, the combination of measures 
introduced with the Program has been demonstrated 
to be effective in addressing the critical demand-side 
barriers that were preventing the deployment of a 
commercially viable renewable energy technology. 
The achieved installations translated into LPG subsidy 
savings of up to USD 101 million over the systems’ life-
time, more than compensating for the USD 21.8 million 
public money invested by the Tunisian Government. 
The added SWH installations translate into 251 ktoe of 
energy savings and 715 ktCO2 avoided. With a leverage 
ratio of 1:5, public financing spurred USD 110.2 million 
in private investments, allowing households to save 
between USD 605-1,325 per SWH in energy bills.
Looking at the main drivers behind these achieve-
ments, and returning to the initial San Giorgio Group 
framing inquiries that guided our research, we ascer-
tain the crucial role of international and domestic 
public finance in Prosol Residential. On one hand, 
international resources acted as an enabling agent to 
build awareness about the market potential among 
local public institutions, local financial investors and, 
ultimately, households. On the other hand, the com-
mitment from the Tunisian Government to financially 
support SWH investments in the short to medium 
term substantially leveled the playing field for renew-
able energy deployment in a market distorted by fossil 
fuel subsidies. 
Besides facilitating the disbursement of financial 
resources, international and local authorities also 
managed to form a coherent institutional and regulatory 
framework (comprising a committed local government, 
an ad-hoc national agency for energy conservation and 
management, the state-owned utility, and foreign aid 
actors in Tunisia) that addressed the multiple financial 
and non-financial barriers that previously prevented the 
development of the SWH market. This institutional and 
regulatory framework also reduced transaction costs 
for households when accessing credit, and improved 
confidence in the technology. Standards and technical 
capacity were systematically embedded, providing a 
long-term platform to support large-scale deployment 
of SWHs and quite possibly some net job creation.
In particular, capacity-building activities proved pivotal 
in the engagement of the local commercial banks in 
unlocking the local credit market. Strong institutional 
coordination and alignment of interests among local 
authorities allowed the Program to effectively ‘crowd-
in’ private capital from local commercial banks, whose 
interest in the SWH technology rose dramatically under 
Prosol compared with previous initiatives. Addressing 
and appropriately mitigating credit risk proved to be the 
key factor in engaging local financial institutions: the 
near-zero realized loan default rates allowed banks to 
preserve their profitability while offering very affordable 
credit to households (at rates roughly half of the prevail-
ing market ones). Notably, thanks to the public utility 
involvement as debt servicer, repayment enforcer, and 
debt guarantor, the perceived credit risk was mitigated 
in a straightforward, effective, and low-cost manner.
Finally, when drawing lessons on the scalability and 
replicability of the Program, the crucial need for a sup-
portive institutional framework tackling audience- and 
technology-specific challenges cannot be overstated. 
In particular, the issues of awareness, technology, and 
credit risk mitigation, as well as competitiveness in 
the face of fossil-fuel subsidization, are important to 
address. 
Nevertheless, we emphasize that it is still too early 
to declare that Prosol is a complete success.  During 
the time frame of our analysis, the initiative has cer-
tainly managed to support, to a very great extent, the 
deployment of solar water heaters through an effec-
tive combination of public and private resources. More 
importantly, the initiative has demonstrated that public 
support for renewable energy can add value to the 
public budget by shifting demand away from heavily 
subsidized fossil fuels, resulting in a net gain for public 
resources.
The design of the financial mechanism and effective 
risk-allocation arrangements has allowed a significant 
leverage of private resources while preserving banks’ 
profitability and credit affordability for households.
At the same time, required technology standards and 
a well-run suppliers’ certification process managed by 
ANME has contributed to improve the quality and reli-
ability of the technology among households, stimulating 
demand and supporting the development of a skilled 
local supply chain.
It is a fair question to ask whether a Prosol-type 
program would achieve sustainable outcomes in the 
long run. In particular, we ask what would happen to 
the SWH market if the Tunisian Government withdrew 
its financial support, particularly given an uncertain 
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political and fiscal environment. This question is best 
answered by looking in parallel at what could happen 
to the subsidies of fossil fuels. Our analysis has shown 
that, in a ‘free-market’ scenario, without any subsidies 
for fossil or for renewable energy, SWHs would be a 
‘first-best’ investment option offering financial returns 
superior to fossil fueled alternatives. Given the context 
in which the Program has been developed and the 
impact of the solar subsidies on the public budget, 
support to SWHs still appears as a ‘second-best solu-
tion’ for the economy as a whole. Hence, a complete 
removal of public support would make its survival dif-
ficult in such a distorted market, without a comparable 
reduction of fossil fuel subsidies. 
The fate of the SWH market in Tunisia will for some 
time continue to rest with the Tunisian Government. 
A rational step would be to advance reform of envi-
ronmentally-harmful fossil fuel subsidies in a clear 
and predictable manner, ensuring that the poorest are 
protected from rapid price rises. Given the ability of 
the current Program to essentially self-finance itself – 
through the displacement of LPG subsidies – we see a 
strong argument in favor of the Government’s continue 
support for the current approach, while also looking at 
how to phase out the LPG subsidies in the same period, 
which offers not only environmental benefits, but real 
cost savings and the opportunity to reshape the coun-
try’s future energy security.
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Index of acronyms
AFDB African Development Bank
ANME 
National Agency for Energy Conservation (Agence 
Nationale pour la Maîtrise de l’Energie)
BAU Business as Usual
CBT Central Bank of Tunisia
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CER Certified Emission Reduction
CPA CDM Programme Activity
CPI Climate Policy Initiative
CSNER
Chambre Syndicale Nationale des Energies 
Renouvelables
EE Energy Efficiency
EPA Energy Purchase Agreements
ERPA Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement
ESCO Energy Services Company
FNME Tunisian National Energy Conservation Fund
GEF Global Environmental Facility
GHG Green House Gases
GIZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit
GOT Government of Tunisia
GOI Government of Italy
IEA International Energy Agency
INS Institut National de la Statistique
IMF International Monetary Fund
LCOE Levelized Cost of Energy
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MATTM 
Italian Ministry for the Environment for Protection of 
Land and Sea 
MEDREC Mediterranean Renewable Energy Centre 
MEDREP Mediterranean Renewable Energy Program
MENA Middle East and North Africa Region
MIEPME
Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Energy and Small and 
Middle Size Enterprises
NPL Non Performing Loans
POA Programme of Activities
RES Renewable Energies
RCREEE Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy
OECD
Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development
OGRT Official Gazette of the Tunisian Republic
PPA Power Purchase Agreement
PROSOL Programme Solaire 
STB Tunisian National Bank (Société Tunisienne de Banque)
STEG 
Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (Tunisian 
Société Tunisienne d’Electricite et du Gaz)
SWH Solar Water Heater
TDN Tunisian Dinars
TOE Tonne of Oil Equivalent
UBCI Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l’Industrie
UNEP–
DTIE 
United Nations Environment Programme - Division of 
Technology, Industry, and Economics
UNFCCC
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
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Appendix A - Methodologies
A1. Investment’s cash flow modeling
We use a cash flow model to examine the impact of 
Prosol support measures on key financial metrics such 
as payback of investment and Levelized Cost of Energy 
(LCOE) from a private investor’s perspective. 
The model evaluates purchase alternatives and the per-
formances of the SWHs during the 15 years of lifetime 
of the SWH. 
Model inputs
•	 Total cost: investment, financing, operations 
and maintenance;
•	 Technical features: SWH energy productivity, 
average efficiency, calorific value; 
•	 Fuel and electricity prices. 
Model assumptions
•	 Households evaluate the investment against 
high-efficient available alternatives. Upfront 
costs, operational costs and energy bills attrib-
utable to the alternative water heaters are all 
accounted as potential cost savings (revenues); 
•	 Households opt for the highest credit lines 
made available by the banks; 
•	 No system defaults occur over the 15 years 
lifetime as constant maintenance is assumed; 
Installation and administrative fees (e.g., STEG 
registration fee for the SWH) are included in 
the price of the water heaters;
Model outputs
•	 LCOE: the cost of energy to the final user 
calculated by dividing actualized negative 
cash flows by the discounted generation, the 
resulting figure is weighted according to the 
existing market structure of SWHs (200 and 
300 liters) and system-specific productivity;
•	 Payback period: the time needed by the 
investor to recover negative cash flows with the 
cost savings originated by the investment.
A2. Thermal energy production and GHG 
savings 
Total energy savings: estimates are based on the yearly 
market deployment and average energy productivity of 
the SWH considering the substitution of the main water 
heating conventional alternatives (LPG; electricity and 
natural gas-fired water heaters). Figures are weighted 
by the generation mix to reflect the evolution of the 
market structure over the considered timeframe, and 
net of an estimated BAU baseline accounting for the 
purchases that would have occurred in the absence of 
Prosol. 
GHGs avoided (CO2): estimated avoided emissions are 
calculated multiplying energy savings by an emission 
factor that quantifies the CO2 released by the specific 
energy source used by the water heater. 
LPG Subsidy (IEA Approach)
The level of LPG subsidy granted to end-users is esti-
mated using the IEA’s price-gap approach75. This meth-
odology compares the reference price of LPG, which 
correspond to the full cost for imports and supply – to 
the end-user price set by the Tunisian Government for 
the 13 kg LPG bottle, the most widely used in the resi-
dential sector for water heating (STEG, 2010; ANME, 
2010a).
According to this approach the level of LPG subsidy is 
expressed as: 
LPG Subsidy = (LPG Reference Price) – (LPG End-user Price)
Model inputs
•	 Import price of butane at the nearest interna-
tional hub i.e. Algeria76;
•	 Average supply costs including transport, 
internal distribution and marketing operations;
•	 Value-added tax (10-12%);
•	 End-user price of the 13 kg LPG bottle. 
Model outputs
The amount of LPG subsidies avoided is calculated as 
the product of the energy savings obtained through the 
substitution of LPG-fired water heaters and the esti-
mated level of subsidization. 
75 For addition information see IEA website, http://www.iea.org/weo/method-
ology_sub.asp. 
76 Butane is largely used in Tunisia for the 13 kg bottles. Given that the country 
imports over the 70% of its LPG consumption needs, we considered import 
prices from Algeria where the largest share of butane is imported from.
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Appendix A.3 – Model Inputs Table
The following table includes all input data used for quantitative analysis in this paper. When possible, data, model-
ing assumptions and results were tested with experts and stakeholders involved in the Program. Where a particular 
modeling input was not available a reasonable proxy was defined, based on available market information and exist-
ing regulation (i.e. conventional water heaters maintenance costs).
Input Description Source
Prosol Program
TIME FRAME 2005-2010 
EXCHANGE RATES
Average TND/USD 2005-2010 exchange rate: 0.7534 
Average EUR/USD 2005-2010 exchange rate: 1.344
Oanda (2012)
CAPITAL COST SUBSIDY
For 2005-2008: 20% of the cost of SWH with a cap of USD 75/m2 (TND 100/m2). 
For 2009-2010: 
USD 150/m2 (TND 200) for SWH with collector area between 1-3 m2 
USD 300/m2 (TND 400) for SWH with a collector area between 3-7 m2 
Since SWH of 200 litres and 300 litres capacity measure on average 2 and 4 m2 
respectively, we assume that the contribution corresponds to around USD 75/m2 (TND 
100 /m2)
Republic of Tunisia 
(2009);
ANME (2007a).
Decree n° 2009-362
INTEREST RATE SUBSIDY
The interest rate subsidy served by MATTM through UNEP applied for the 5 years of the 
loans contracted during the first 18th months of Prosol I, until exhaustion of the granted 
fund. 
= 7% for 12 months; reduced to 4% in the following 6 months.
Haselip et al. (2011)
PROSOL DEBT INTEREST 
RATE
The interest rates requested by the banks every year correspond to: 7% for Prosol I; 
TMM+1 for Prosol II in 2007 and TMM+1.2 in 2008-2010. For each specific loan vintage, 
Interest Rates are assumed fixed during the five years of debt repayment: 7.0% (2005-
2006); 6.26% (2007); 6.40% (2008); 6.37% (2009); 5.49% (2010); 6.00% (2011)
Central Bank of Tunisia 
(2012); GTZ (2006); 
Missaoui (2007)
DEBT DEFAULT RATES Prosol (Residental) loan default rate: 1%                                                                                              ANME (2012b)   
CREDIT LINES 
CONTRACTED WITHIN 
PROSOL (USD)
Loans contracted in 2005-2006 are estimated assuming 50% access to credit and 70% 
average debt coverage for the purchase of SWHs.
For the 2007-2011 actual amount of credit lines contracted by households are provided 
by STEG (2012): USD 5,396,981 (2007); 16,935,453 (2008); 18,029,088 (2009); 
19,963,179 (2010).
STEG (2012); Touhami 
(2011), Energie del Sole 
(2012)
Water Heaters Market Data
SWH DEPLOYMENT 
DATA
Number of SWH systems units and m2 installed every year.
Installation: 7,093 (2005); 10,843 (2006); 19,100 (2007); 27,500 (2008); 27,000 
(2009); 27,500 (2010).
Collector surface area (m2): 22,312 (2005); 34,730 (2006); 55,308 (2007); 80,000 
(2008); 82,000 (2009); 81,000 (2010).
MATTM (2009a), Bahri 
(2011)
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Input Description Source
SWH BAU DEPLOYMENT 
TRENDS
SWHs units installed in 2004: 2,500 
This figure marks the lowest point for SWHs, in terms of market deployment. It can 
be considered a conservative figure because: (1) SWH technology improvements and 
rising energy prices may have made SWH more attractive to households, even in a BAU 
scenario where SWH lacks the support of a subsidy scheme; (2) Policy expectations 
over the setting up of a financing Program on SWH may have postponed households’ 
purchasing decisions from 2004 to the following years.
MATTM (2009a), Bahri 
(2011)
WATER HEATERS 
MARKET STRUCTURE
Market shares in 2004: LPG (72%), Electricity (11%), Natural Gas (14%), SWH (3%)
Market shares in 2009: LPG (67%), Electricity (7%), Natural Gas (19%), SWH 
(7%)
This data is used to estimate SWH substitutions in the residential market. Intermediate 
data is estimated through a trend. 
STEG (2010)
SWH PRICES (USD/M2)
USD 371 (2005); 382 (2006); 371 (2007); 374 (2008); 390 (2009); 422 
(2010); 454 (2011).
Weighted average of price per square meter of SWHs in Tunisia based on market shares 
of 200 l and 300 l SWHs
Missaoui and Marrouki 
(2009a)
MATTM (2009a)
ANME (2012a)
CONVENTIONAL WATER 
HEATER PRICES (USD)
LPG and Natural Gas-fired WH (10 l): USD 120 (TND 160) 
LPG and Natural Gas-fired WH (13 l):  USD 150 (TND 200)
Electric WH (200 l): USD 166 (TND 220)
Electric WH (300 l): USD 234 (TND 300)
ANME (2010a)
SWH TECHNICAL DATA 
EXPECTED LIFE-CYCLE 15 years
ANME (2010a),
TÜV SÜD (2011)
USAGE RATE (RESIDEN-
TIAL SECTOR)
99%
Rate measured based on the average number of days spent outside home by Tunisian 
residents, as reported in UNFCCC (2011a). According to UNFCCC (2011a) this is a 
conservative value.
ANME (2010a) 
AVERAGE ENERGY 
PRODUCTIVITY
SWH 200 litres: 1,148 kWh/year 
SWH 300 litres:  2,506 kWh/year 
Average annual energy output for SWHs estimated through the SOLO model developed 
by the Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment, assuming daily consumption 
matching tank capacity and average irradiation in Tunisia.
SWH Models: SOFTEN (Giordano) simulations with model C8/8 S.U, H.S.U C8/12 
S.U, H.S.U; and C8/8 S HI C8/8 H.S HI, C8/12 S HI C8/12 H.S HI. Insulation type 
Polyurethane (3 cm thickness). SOFTEN is the largest distributor of SWHs in Tunisia. 
Storage tank outside: 200 liters (300 liters) 
Location: we used a city located in the mid-Tunisia Sfax as a representative of the 
average insulation
Consumption: 200 l/day  (300 l/day for 300 l SWH)
Collector: with 45° slant and orientation towards south.
Coefficients: β = 0.75; k = 4
Centre Scientifique et 
Technique du Bâtiment 
(2012).
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Input Description Source
SYSTEM DEFAULT RISK 
“NO ACTION” SCENARIO
The theoretical cumulated default probability risk of a SWH, due to the absence of 
maintenance, tends to grow exponentially with time from 11% at its second year of 
operation – being the first covered by full guarantee – to 81% at its 15th year, the end of 
its expected life-time.
CPI elaboration based on 
Mirrouki and Missaoui 
and Marrouki (2009b)
MAINTENANCE COSTS
SWH 200 l = USD 30/year (TND 40)
SWH 300 l = USD 45/year (TND 60)
Missaoui and Marrouki 
(2009b)
CONVENTIONAL WATER HEATERS TECHNICAL DATA
LPG: AVERAGE WEIGHT 
OF BOTTLES
Residential sector: 13 kg
Hotel sector: 25 kg
STEG (2010), ANME 
(2011a), other sources.
AVERAGE EFFICIENCY 
PER ENERGY SOURCE 
High-efficiency water heaters: Electricity: 94%; LPG: 86% Natural Gas 86%
Conventional water heaters (low-medium efficiency): Electricity: 88%; LPG: 55%; 
Natural Gas: 55%
Ressource naturelles 
Canada  (2005)
ANME (2011a)
NET CALORIFIC VALUE  LPG: 11,060 (kcal/kg); Natural Gas 9 (Th/Nm3) ANME (2011a)
GHG EMISSIONS 
FACTORS (TCO2/MWH)
LPG: 0.227, Electricity: 0.550, Natural Gas: 0.202
IPCC (2006). ANME 
(2011a)
MAINTENANCE COSTS
LPG WH: USD 38/year (TND 50) 
Natural Gas WH: USD 38/year (TND 50) 
Electric WH: USD 15/year (TND 20) 
CPI’s assumption based 
on communication with 
stakeholders’ 
ENERGY MARKET DATA
LPG IMPORT PRICE AND 
VOLUME
Import price of butane from Algeria up to 2010.
We used butane as a proxy for LPG contained in the 13 kg bottles used in the Tunisian 
residential sector.
Price estimates for 2011-2025 are derived from annual growth rates of crude oil real 
prices grossed-up with annual forecasted inflation rates for Tunisia.
INS (2012)
INS (2012)
IEA (2011)
IMF (2011)
ESTIMATED LPG 
AVERAGE SUPPLY COSTS 
AND VAT (USD/T)
Approximately USD/t 287 
It refers to transport, distribution and marketing costs and VAT 
Due to the lack of data availability we estimated supply costs based on the average 
difference between observed reference prices and butane import prices from Algeria 
during the period 2005-2010. 
Calculation based on 
various sources, including 
local news websites, APIE 
reports, INS (2012a), INS 
(2012b).
LPG END-USER PRICES 
Residential sector: figures on LPG end-use prices in the residential sector are sourced 
from the National Statistics office for the years up to 2009, from governmental 
communications for the years 2010-2011. 
Prices refer to 13 kg bottles.
Price estimates for 2011-2025 are derived from a linear growth trend. This reflects the 
trend observed in annual average end-user LPG prices since Prosol inception.
Tertiary sector: figures on LPG end-use prices for the tertiary sector are sourced from 
governmental communications up to 2011. 
Prices refer to 25 kg bottles.
All prices include VAT.
INS (2010); Various 
sources, including local 
news  websites, APIE 
reports 
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Input Description Source
ELECTRICITY PRICES
Prices for the residential sector refer to the 12 months average of all tranches (low and 
normal) for low tension electricity rates. Prices for the tertiary sector refer to the same 
tranches excluding rates reserved to the residential sector only.
Price estimates for 2011-2025 are derived from a linear growth trend.
All prices are grossed-up with VAT.
APIE reports
NATURAL GAS PRICES
Prices for the residential sector refer to the 12 months average of low pressure natural 
gas rates for tranche 1. Prices for the tertiary sector refer to the 12 months average for 
tranche 2.
Price estimates for 2011-2025 are derived from a linear growth trend.
All prices are grossed-up with VAT.
APIE reports
FINANCIAL DATA
DISCOUNT RATE FOR 
HOUSEHOLDS AND 
TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT
Tunisian Government Bonds with maturities of 4 and 6 years: 5.44%
Given the 5 years loan commitment, for households the most suitable discount rate 
is represented by the average interest rate of Tunisian treasury bonds with analogous 
maturity, considering these as a low-risk investment alternative to the SWH. The same 
discount rate is used to indicate inter-temporal preferences for the Tunisian Government 
as the commitment of public resources extends on a similar time-frame.
Central Bank of Tunisia 
(2012)
DISCOUNT RATE FOR 
THE TERTIARY SECTOR 
The discount rate is derived from a simplified CAPM applied to the overall Tunisian 
equity market.
Cost of equity = (risk free rate) + (market risk premium):
11.86% = 4.75% + 7.11%
The risk free rate is calculated as the average TMM rate for the period 2005-2011. The 
market risk premium for Tunisia is estimated based on the model developed by Professor 
Damodaran (New York University), linking equity market risk premia to government bond 
ratings and country default spread.
Central Bank of Tunisia 
(2012), Damodaran 
(2012)
INFLATION RATES
2005-2010 average compounded inflation rate (end-of-period consumer prices): 3.68%
2011-2025 average compounded inflation rate (end-of-period consumer prices): 3.08%
IMF (2011)
BANKING DATA
PRE-PROSOL DEBT 
INTEREST RATE Consumer loan interest rate: 13% Touhami (2011)
DEFAULT RATES Estimated from the average level of NPL over total loans in banks’ balance sheets: 15% 
Central Bank of Tunisia 
(2006-2011)
BANKS COST OF 
RESOURCES     2005-2010 average bank funding rate: 3.5%                                  
Central Bank of Tunisia 
(2006-2011)
 46A CPI Report
San Giorgio Group Case Study: Prosol TunisiaJune 2012
Appendix B - Prosol Residential Risks Management
SWH FAILURE RATES
BAsE CAsE (No 
DEFAUlT RIsk) 3% P.A.
No 
MAINTENANCE
PAYBACK 10 11.5 20
ENERGY BILL SAVINGS 100% 82% 68%
Table 1. Impact of default 
rates on SWHs profit-
ability
Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference section).
LOAN DEFAULT RATES
BAsE CAsE 
(PRosol II) 5% 15%
IRR 5.8% 3.1% -4.1%
LOAN REPAYMENTS
 + INTEREST RATES
100% 92.6% 76.5%
Table 2. Impact of debt 
defaults on banks’ 
returns
Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference section).
Risk assessment
1. SWHs failure risks and associated impacts 
on the profitability of the “green” investment 
Table 1 presents the results of a sensitivity test we run 
on the SWH’s payback and on the amount of energy 
bills saved by households starting from an ‘ideal’ 0% 
rate (however, very closed to the realized one in the 
Program) to an arbitrary fixed annual default rate of 3% 
per annum, and a variable one, exponentially growing 
over time, estimated from a ‘no-maintenance’ scenario 
(Missaoui and Marrouki, 2009b).77
2. Debt-default and associated benefits risks
The impact associated to debt-default risk was esti-
mated by applying different rates of default to a Prosol 
loan’s cash flow stream, starting from the 1% rate real-
ized in the Program to an estimated average market rate 
of 15%, deducted from the non-performing loans share 
of bank’s portfolios. As per business practice, a recov-
ery rate of 0%78 was also assumed. Table 2 highlights 
the impacts resulting on banks’ IRR and their expected 
cash flows recovery.79
3. Program failure and associated benefits 
risks
To test the potential impact of different SWH uptake on 
the Tunisian Government expected returns we stressed 
the number of actual installations by a factor of +/-10 
and +/-20%.
77 The Table reflects payback changes occurring when SWH are supported by 
the measure introduced under Prosol I..
78 Consumer loans are generally without collateral, hence banks’ recovery rate 
are typically negligible. 
79 Estimated at current Prosol interest rates (6%) and cost of capital (3.1% at 
bank funding rates).
TOTAL DEPLOYMENT
∆ -20% ∆ -10% BAsE CAsE ∆ +20% ∆ +20%
LPG SUBSIDIES SAVINGS (USD MIN) -24 -12 101 10 23
GHG EMISSIONS (KTCO2) -165 -82 715 82 165
ENERGY SAVINGS (KTOE) -58 -29 251 29 57
Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference section).
Table 3. Impact of different installation rates on 
Prosol’s returns.
Table 4. Risk m
atrix - Prosol I (2005-2006).
Source: CPI elaboration based on various sources (see Reference section).
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3. Residential 
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2
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ents
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ards)
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m
ercial Partnership Insurance’ (CPI): to insure up to to 80%
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ent or 
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ent
• Leasing com
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m
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 of 5 years and the dow
n 
paym
ent w
ill be negotiable.
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